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ABSTRACT
Models for Multi-Strata Safety Performance Measurements in the Process Industry.
(December 2003)
Nir Keren, B.S., Ben Gurion University, Israel;
M.S., Ben Gurion University, Israel
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Sam Mannan
Measuring process safety performance is a challenge, and the wide variations in
understanding, compliance, and implementation of process safety programs increase the
challenge. Process safety can be measured in three strata: (1) measurement of process
safety elements within facilities; (2) benchmarking of process safety elements among
facilities; and (3) use of incident data collection from various sources for industrial
safety performance assessment.
The methods presently available for measurement of process safety within
facilities are deficient because the results are strongly dependent on user judgment.
Performance benchmarking among facilities is done within closed groups of
organizations. Neither the questionnaires nor the results are available to the public.
Many organizations collect data on industrial incidents. These organizations differ from
each other in their interests, data collection procedures, definitions, and scope, and each
of them analyzes its data to achieve its objectives. However, there have been no attempts
to explore the potential of integrating data sources and harnessing these databases for
industrial safety performance assessment.
In this study we developed models to pursue the measurement of samples of the
strata described above. The measurement methodologies employed herein overcome the
disadvantages of existing methodologies and increase their capabilities.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background
The fallout of dioxin caused by a runaway reaction at Seveso, Italy, in 1976, and
the 1984 disaster of Bhopal, India, led to major changes in laws over the world. Federal
and industrial entities devoted major efforts toward risk reduction and hazard control.
Most of the organizations in the chemical industry integrated their systems for safety.
The numbers of fatalities and injuries were parameters that safety performance was
measured with until the late seventies. Major progress was accomplished since the
seventies. Organizations, academicians, and legislators realized that since the number of
catastrophic incidents is low, the number of fatalities and injuries are not reasonable
indicators for measurements of safety performance. “The absence of a very unlikely
event is not, of itself, a sufficient indicator of good safety management” [1]. Injuries,
illnesses, and losses should be measured, but they are only part of the bottom line of
safety performance, and are not good as a feedback for safety management.
Previous Work
Most organizations that employ measurements of process safety elements within
facilities developed these measurements by a local staff, and some of them involved
consulting companies that helped to develop the measurement system to address the
facility’s unique characteristics. York [2] reports on a facilitated self-assessment
measuring system of North American Rhodia Inc. that is incorporates the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management standard
(PSM) and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Risk Management Program
_______________
This dissertation follows the style and format of Process Safety Progress.
2(RMP) requirements as well as Responsible Care Process Safety Code elements and
additional Rhodia requirements. The measurement system is lacking since it consists
primarily of user evaluations.
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) developed a measurement
system for measurements of PSM elements in facilities. A computerized program
version has been launched
1
(Pro-Smart) by CCPS. The program is useful toward
measurement of progress of a certain facility. Furthermore, the results are more credible
when the same user makes the evaluations over time. The general concept of the
measurement system is emphasized in a paper written by CCPS executives and members
and published on the web
2
.
Benchmarking of process safety elements is mostly conducted among facilities,
but neither the questionnaires nor the results are available to the general public. CCPS
benchmarks Management of Change program practices among its members. However,
the benchmarking report is not available.
Most of the efforts in the development of process safety performance
measurements are invested toward measuring the industry as a whole and with some
efforts directed toward performance measurements of federal agencies.
OSHA is a federal agency under the authority of the Department of Labor (DOL)
and is responsible for the safety and health of employees in the work place. OSHAFs
incidence rate is a statistical index that measures illnesses and injuries per 100 worker
years [3]. The Fatality Accident Rate (FAR) is a European index mostly used by the
British and is a statistical index that measures the number of fatalities per 1000
employees working their entire lifetime (50 working years per employee). Indices as
FAR and Incidents Rate which represent failure to effectively control risks are called
Trailing Indicators. These indices are important, and can be used to measure
1
The program is a commercial product. A demo is available at
http://www.aiche.org/ccps/prosmart/index.htm , (September 2003) but it reveals very little about the
features of the program and the concept.
2
D. J. Campbell, E.M. Connelly, J. S. Arendt, B. G. Perry, S. Schreiber, “Performance Measurement
of Process Safety Management Systems”,
www.concordassoc.com/publicayionsSan%20Antonio%20Paper1.html (September 2003).
3performance in the process industries (as well as in any other industry). However,
fatalities, injuries, and illnesses are only the outcomes of a safety culture. Recognizing
that safety management input should be measured as well as outcomes, many entities
developed indices that address inputs. Indices that measure the level of risk reduction
(inputs) are called Leading Indicators. Travers [4] considered three groups of Indicators:
• Indicators of the degree/frequency of major incidents or those with the potential
to escalate to major incidents (mainly trailing indicators)
• Indicators of the effectiveness and future effectiveness of risk control revealed
through regulatory interventions (a mixture of leading and trailing indicators)
• Indicators of public assurance in the effectiveness of risk control (mainly leading
indicators
Travers' work consists of a list of indicators. A few questions arise regarding the
proposed measures:
• How comprehensive is his proposal? (Especially in light of trying to address
major hazards in all major hazardous industries)
• This work refers to European regulations and standards. Are these standards
applicable toward measurements in the US?
• How feasible are the existing data that support the measures proposed in the
work?
• What are the characteristics of the indicators and do the proposed indicators fit
these characteristics?
Travers' work is preliminary and may answer these questions in the future.
Newell [5] (Organization Resources Counselors Inc.) presents a very well developed
concept of process safety performance measurements. In his work, Newell analyzes in
detail OSHA's database as a sole source of data for performance measurements. Newell
4recommends using the OSHA rates for measurements only as part of comprehensive
balanced assessments that include other key information. Newell calls for use of leading,
trailing and financial indicators rather than trailing indicators only. His work is based on
the balanced scorecard, which is best emphasized by [1] “Accentuate the positive to
eliminate the negative”. This concept has been widely used since the early nineties and is
common to many suggestions for performance measurement systems. Newell’s work
describes the features of the trailing, and leading indicators, but it does not actually
develop the indicators. Although this work does not introduce the indicators, its
contribution is significant in the phase where data sources are considered and in the
phase of defining the indicators. Similar works to have been done by Ritwik [6] (Kuwait
National Petroleum Co.), Walker et al. [7] (ABS Consulting), Morrison [8] (Nova
Chemicals, Inc.), and Toellner [9]. All of these works contribute to some of the process
safety performance measurement issues but none of them are comprehensive, well
defined, and developed.
The European Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) launched a project related to the development of Safety Performance Indicators
for Chemical Accidents Prevention, Preparedness and Response [10] & [11], six years
after publishing guiding principles for chemical accident prevention, preparedness and
response that was implemented by 29 countries including Canada. OECD distinguishes
between the industry and the public, and [10] discusses the Canadian stakeholder view
of accident prevention, emergency preparedness, and response. Its indicators have many
similarities to the OSHA VPP program. OECD [10] introduces the general concept for
process safety performance indicators. According to this paper the project interim report
should have been published in 2002, however, the report is not available.
Many organizations collect data on industrial incidents. These organizations
differ from each other in their interests, data collection procedures, definitions, and
scope, and each of them is analyzing its data to achieve its goal and to accomplish its
mission. There is an increased interest in using data on incidents to improve safety in the
last 20 years. In the late 1980s, V. C. Marshal consolidated incident data from sixty or
5so years and harnessed it toward loss reduction, and loss prevention in his book Major
Chemical Hazards [12]. Today the interest is bigger than ever, because of the
development of information technologies that look promising in their abilities to see
what “unarmed human eye” cannot see. Major efforts are being invested toward
collection of incident related data. The US Department of Health and Human Services,
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) maintains Hazardous
Substances Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) and publishes annual and
cumulative reports [13], and is only one among many other type of data collection
projects that is maintained by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
The US Department of Transportation repository consists of a large number of
transportation safety related databases, and many reports are available on their website
[14]. The last are only two from at least 15 sources of information of incident related
data that have been analyzed and incorporated in assessments of industrial safety
performance by the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, at the Texas A&M
University, College Station Texas (MKOPSC). However, the main challenge in using
incident related data only begins when the data is available.
Marono et al. suggest use of the European Commission accident-reporting
database, MARS, as a support for the definition of a safety performance indicator system
[15]. McCray and Mannan are the first to look at several databases to analyze
opportunities for risk reduction and loss prevention [16]. Mannan with O’Connor and
West established the basis for a continual effort to exhaust the potential that is hidden in
incident databases in their paper “Accident History Databases: An Opportunity” [17].
Mannan et al. looked again into EPA RMP Info database in order to determine the most
significant chemical releases [18] as part of the efforts described above. Early in 2002
the MKOPSC published a report on the feasibility of using federal incident databases to
measure and improve chemical safety [19].
6Scope of Dissertation
In this dissertation I developed models for performance measurements of
elements of process safety in three levels:
• Within facilities
• Among facilities
• Across industries
Three Disciplines Approach
Three disciplines can be distinguished within the spectrum of process safety
performance measurements:
• Measurements of Process Safety Elements within Facilities
• Benchmarking of Process Safety Elements among Facilities
• Assessment of Industrial Safety Performance
Measurements of Process Safety Elements within Facilities
OSHA PSM is a comprehensive standard. PSM element compartmentalization in
the standard creates an opportunity to develop measurement models for each of the
elements separately. For example, lack of appropriate Management of Change practices
is reported to be the cause for a significant number of the incidents in the chemical and
petrochemical industries. Therefore, this work presents the development of an index-
based model for management of change performance measurements according to
guidelines that are listed in Chapter II.
Benchmarking of Process Safety Elements among Facilities
The performance-based nature of the PSM element is apparent from a reading of
the regulatory requirements. Thus it is difficult to claim with certainty what is meant by
7regulatory compliance. Practices often vary and there is a critical need to determine the
industry consensus or Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP). The effort of benchmarking PSM elements is thus aimed at developing
benchmarks of industry practices for various process safety management requirements.
Benchmarking of PSM elements is a sequence composed of 4 stages:
1. Decomposition of the element to its basic components
2. Questionnaire development
3. Surveying facilities
4. Results analysis
Emergency Preparedness and Response, Management of Change, and
Investigation of Chemical Process Incidents are some of the crucial elements in process
safety programs. This work presents the results of benchmarking of practices of the
Management of Change, and Emergency Preparedness and Response elements, and a
questionnaire for the Incident Investigation element.
Assessment of Industrial Safety Performance
The flow chart in Figure 1-1 is a simplified description of the process of using
incident data collection from various sources for industrial safety performance
assessment. The primary focus of industrial safety performance assessment, which uses
the methodology described herein, is to establish a baseline metrics for the universe
under investigation with regard to safety. This requires identification of incident trends,
distribution of number of incidents, number of injuries, property damage costs, releases
of materials, hospitalizations, and evacuations. These should be analyzed and correlated
across the causes of incidents, equipment involved, initiation events, location, and other
indicators. Several of the sources of information that are available collect only part or a
sample of the information. However, it is possible to estimate the total number of
chemical/product related incidents by applying statistical tools on the data.
Implementation of indicator-based industrial performance measurement systems helps to
8determine whether the efforts invested toward safety improvement lead to the desired
results. Other benefits are the ability to determine the areas that will lead to major
reduction of losses and reduction in the number of incidents.
The study herein presents the development of a methodology described above
and the results of implementation of this methodology to analyze and identify poor
safety performance factors in the propane industry.
Review of sources
Database development
Integration of data into the database
Duplication identification and removal
Estimate of
total incidents
Pattern
identification
Trend analysis
Analysis and Conclusions
Figure 1-1. Methodology flow chart
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INDEX-AIDED MODEL FOR PROCESS SAFETY PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENTS OF MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROGRAM
PRACTICES
Guidelines for the Development of an Index-Aided Model
MOC programs are implemented in diverse ways [20]. Because of the
performance-based nature of MOC programs, they can be implemented to meet at the
minimum OSHA PSM requirements or on the other hand MOC programs can be
implemented with the desire to achieve the best practice. This chapter documents the
development of an index-aided model for MOC safety performance measurement
system.
Measuring MOC Program Performance - Elements
Program Characteristics
Auditing
Scope of Program
Training
Hazard Identification
Authorization Process
Outcomes
Program Outputs
Level of Activity of Program
Maintenance Work Orders
MOC Work Orders
Temporary MOC Work Order
Emergency MOC Work Orders
Figure 2-1. Measurement input
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Various factors affect the performance of a MOC program. Scope of the
program, level of awareness, implementation of temporary and emergency MOC
procedures, and usage of risk screening techniques are among these factors. According
to the model that is developed in this study, two types of inputs are required for
measuring MOC program performance measurements:
1. Periodical measurements, such as the number of Maintenance Work Orders that
were miss-classified in the time period under investigation;
2. Characteristics of the program, such as techniques that are available for hazard
identification;
Figure 2.2 presents the type of elements that will be considered in the
measurement system. As explained previously, existing models of process safety
performance measurements within facilities are not getting credit, because the users are
required to evaluate elements in the program according to their best judgment.
Therefore, measurements that are conducted by different users probably reveal different
results.
The major guideline for the development of the model here is to establish a
measurement system that is independent of the evaluator. A measurement system that is
developed according to this guideline will establish a basis for performance comparisons
among facilities. However, to eliminate subjectivity from the evaluators, some elements
must be standardized, and this process requires a survey of a panel of experts.
Application of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique will be developed to
standardize these elements. The following is a brief description of the principle of the
AHP methodology.
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Technique
Several decision making methods were examine in this study: Weighted Sum
Model (WSM), Weighted Product Model (WPM), Elimination and Choice Translating
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Realty (ELECTRA), Techniques for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution
(TOPSIS), and the Analytical Hierarchy Processing (AHP) [38]. The ability of AHP to
incorporate interaction among factors in the model, and to track consistency in
judgment, are leading factors in the decision to use AHP in this study. The method and
its advantages are described bellow.
Thomas L. Saaty developed the AHP in 1982, and published his book ªDecision
Making for Leadersº[21] in 1986. Saaty was employed by the Department of Defense as
a mathematician working on an analytical framework for group decisions. Recognizing
the limitations of humans to manage complex decisions, the AHP was developed to
work with multi-criteria and multi-alternative situations to simplify the decision making
process to a level that the human brain can synthesize using a natural intuitive logic. In
the safety universe, AHP is used solely and with other predictive methods to predict
occupational injuries [22,23] and for several other applications. AHP is a leading
decision-making method in transportation because of its power to prioritize high
precision processes. Moreover, AHP is widely used for environmental decision-making
and prioritization [24]. The AHP methodology can be divided into four major stages:
1. Hierarchical structuring of the problem, which is structured hierarchically
similar to a flow chart. The overall objective is placed at the top, the criteria and
sub-criteria bellow, and the alternatives at the bottom.
2. Assignment of relative importance weights: In this stage the decision maker
determines the relative importance of a set of criteria, a set(s) of sub-criteria, and
a set of alternatives. An independent comparison among every combination of
couple of elements from a certain level with respect to a relevant element from a
higher level in the hierarchy is part of the procedure. This technique of
comparisons of a couple of criteria or a couple of elements at a time is known as
pairwise comparisons.
3. Inconsistency calculations: The level of inconsistency in decision making can be
measured and calculated in comparison to random decision making.
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4. Overall priority weight determination: At this stage the priority weights of each
of the alternative are calculated.
AHP has several advantages over conventional scoring methods, which could
have been used to accomplish the goal in this study:
1. The Pairwise comparisons process increases the accuracy of alternative
comparisons, because the methodology uses a set of comparisons to evaluate the
alternatives with respect to a single criterion at a time.
2. Pairwise comparisons are used to assign weights to the criteria in the same way it
is done for alternatives; however, it is done in a separate stage.
3. The internal inconsistency in the judgment of the criteria and the alternatives is
quantified.
4. AHP works with interdependence of elements and is not limited to linear
thinking.
5. The AHP does not require consensus. The methodology synthesizes a
representative outcome from diverse judgments.
The following is an example of a problem and a Pairwise comparisons question:
Assume the following overall objective: selecting the best college. The criteria for
judging the alternatives are National Rank, Costs, and Location. The alternatives will be
Texas A&M, MIT, and Cal Tech. Figure 2-2 demonstrates the hierarchy of the problem:
The following is an example question that compares the importance of the
National Rank criterion and the Cost criterion with respect to the overall goal: How
much more important is National Rank than Cost with respect to Selecting the Best
College?
13
National Rank is more important than Cost: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Or,
Cost is more important than National Rank: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Where the numeric values are indicating the following:
1 - Equal Importance
2 – Equal to weakly more important
3 - Weakly more important
4 – Weakly to strongly more important
5 - Strongly more important
6 – Strongly to very strongly more important
7 – Very strongly more important
8 - Very strongly to absolutely more important
9 - Absolutely more important
Selecting 7 in the upper row emphasizes that National Rank is very strongly
more important than Cost in the process of selecting a college. Selecting 5 in the lower
row emphasizes that Cost is strongly more important than National Rank. Similarly,
National Rank is compared with Location, and later Cost is compared with Location. It
is expected that if National Rank was selected to be twice as important as Cost, and Cost
is three times more important than Location, then National Rank is six times more
Selecting the Best
College
National Rank Cost Location
Texas A&M MIT Cal Tec.
Figure 2-2. The best college problem hierarchy
The overall goal:
Criteria:
Alternatives:
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important than Location. Although it seems intuitive in a three element system, it is not
so simple for a larger number of elements. The Analytical Hierarchy Process
methodology can extract the relative importance of elements in a problem and measure
the level of inconsistency as described above. A 10% inconsistency is recommended as a
cut-off value for revision of the judgments. The AHP analysis process is described in the
following paragraphs.
AHP Analysis
Calculating the Weights
Assume that ija is the value of comparison of element i with element j. Therefore
it represents the ratio between the weight of element i ( iw ) and the weight of element j 
( jw ) as shown by Equation 2-1:
j
i
ij w
w
a = (2-1)
The ija is equal to 1 wherever i = j (since the element is compared with itself).
Moreover, jia is the reciprocal of ija :
i
j
ij
ji w
w
a
a ==
1
(2-2)
Assigning the comparison of relative weights between elements into a matrix will
yield the following form:
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The following step performs normalization of the matrix. The sum of the vectors
∑
=
n
i
ij
a
1
are calculated for this purpose, and the values within each vector are divided by
this sum. The matrix changes form as follows:
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The component of the weight of element i in column j is calculated according to
Equation 2-5:
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Then, the final weight of element i is calculated by averaging the ( )j
i
w along row i:
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Measuring Inconsistency
If element i is ija times more important than element j, and element j is jka times
more important than element k, then consistency will require that element i is ( jkij aa • )
times more important than element k.
Multiplication of matrix A by the weight vector w will produce the results in
Equation 2-7 only if the judgments are perfectly consistent:
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If wnwA = , as demonstrated above, then w is an Eigen vector of matrix A, and
the Eigen value is n=λ . However, results are rarely consistent. The AHP methodology
calculates a Consistency Index (CI) as follows:
• Multiply matrix A by the weight vector w to form vector B
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• Divide each component of vector B with the corresponding component in the
weight vector w to form new vector C
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• Average the components of vector C to obtain an approximation of maxλ :
∑
=
=
n
i
i
c
n 1
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1
λ (2-10)
• Finally, the CI for a matrix of size of n is calculated as follows:
1
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−
−
=
n
n
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λ
(2-11)
However, to measure consistency on a familiar scale, it is compared to a
consistency of a random assignment of weights. A very large number of simulations
with random weights with several sizes for matrix established a Random Consistency
Index (RI). Table 2-1 presents the results of these simulations:
Table 2-1. Random consistency for various matrix sizes
Matrix size n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RI 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.51
Finally, the Consistency Ratio (CR) is calculated by comparing the Consistency
Index to the random consistency:
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RI
CI
CR = (2-12)
A CR value of less than 0.1 is considered to be a reasonable consistency [29].
Presentation of the Problem of This Study
The hierarchy chart of this study is too large to present in a single figure, so the
problem is presented in segments. The problem will be introduced and discussed from
the overall goal at the top to the elements at the bottom. At the beginning, the relations
among the major criteria with respect to the overall goal will be presented. Then the
branches of the major criteria will be discussed, and the hierarchies will be developed to
the level of elements. A questionnaire that was developed according to the guidelines
described previously was distributed among the following six experts:
• Dr. M. Sam Mannan: Professor of Chemical Engineering at Texas A&M
University, College Station, Texas, Director of the Mary Kay O'Connor Process
Safety Center (MKOPSC), at Texas A&M University (TAMU), internationally
recognized process safety expert, and a reviewers of several process safety
journals.
• Dr. Harry H. West: a member of the Steering Committee and the Technical
Advisory Committee of the MKOPSC TAMU, and internationally recognized
expert and process safety consultant.
• Mr. Roy E. Sanders: a senior process safety executive, a member of the
Technical Advisory Committee at the MKOPSC, TAMU, lecturer of several
courses as part of the Continuing Education program of the MKOPSC, TAMU,
and lecturer of courses that are offered by the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers. Moreover, Mr. Sanders wrote the well-recognized book ªManagement
of Change In Chemical Plants; Learning from Case Historiesº [25].
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• Mr. Skip W. Early: process safety consultant, a member of the Technical
Advisory Committee at the MKOPSC, TAMU, lecturer of several courses as
part of the Continuing Education program of the MKOPSC, TAMU.
• Mr. Adrian L. Sepeda: Served many years as a safety executive at Occidental
Chemicals. Upon his retirement, Mr. Sepeda offers his services as a process
safety consultant, and is currently consultant to the Center of Chemical Process
Safety (CCPS), at the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Among his
duties Mr. Sepeda is a lecturer with the Continuing Education program at the
MKOPSC, TAMU.
• Mr. Donald W. Jenkins: worked as a project engineer with Amoco Production
for many years, was among the group that defined PSM for Amoco Production in
the 1990's. Upon his retirement, Mr. Jenkins returned to BP Amoco as a
consultant, and is in charge of MOC in the offshore projects office.
The responses of the experts (the estimations) were geometrically averaged [26].
Then, these averages were rounded to the closest value on the AHP scale (a discrete
scale of 9,8,..,2,1,1/2 , 1/3,..,1/9). The rounded values will be referred as the estimations
in this chapter. The estimations are then substituted in the matrices, and then analyzed
according to Equations 2-1 to 2-12. The hierarchies of the branches with the results are
presented below.
Overall Goal: Safety Performance Measurements of MOC Program Practices
The MOC program consists of a variety of performance influencing factors. This
study suggests a performance evaluation system of MOC program practices according to
six factors that will be used as criteria in the hierarchies in the problem. The following is
a description of these factors:
1. Scope of program: areas in the plant that are subject to the MOC program
2. Authorization process: the process of authorization of the various types of MOC
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3. MOC training: training frequencies, type of training, and employees that
participated in the training program.
4. Internal audit process: content that is addressed by the audit program.
5. Hazard identification: capabilities of the MOC program to detect change-related
hazards.
6. Outcomes: measurement of flaws, e.g., the number of failures to miss-classify
Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs) as MOCs.
Figure 2-3 demonstrates the hierarchy tree of the overall goal and the major six
criteria:
Matrix 2-13 consists of the estimations, and Table 2-2 consists of the relative
weights and the consistency ratio:
MOC PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
Scope of
Program
Authorization MOC
Training
Audit Hazard
Identification
Outcomes
Figure 2-3. Hierarchy of the overall goal
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Table 2-2. Relative weights and C.R. of the overall goal set of criteria
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Scope of Program 0.160
Authorization 0.123
MOC Training 0.234
Audit 0.074
Hazard Identification 0.230
Outcomes 0.178
C.R.= 0.00
Scope of Program
Paragraph 29 CFR 1910.119(1) of the OSHA PSM standard requires that
employers must write and implement procedures to manage changes in processes that
are covered under the OSHA PSM. However, Management of Change procedures are
implemented in diverse ways. Although the requirements of OSHA PSM are limited to
specific systems, other systems that are not covered under OSHA PSM can be crucial to
the safe operation of the plant. The result of a study of MOC program practices [20]
reveals that implementation of the MOC program varies from a level that is considered a
violation of the PSM requirements to a level at which all disciplines in the organizations
are subject to MOC programs, including organizational changes.
Facilities in plants can be divided to four major groups:
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1. Group A – Critical Areas
2. Group B – Utility Areas
3. Group C – Associated Areas
4. Group D - Organizational Changes
This study distinguishes among four groups of areas, groups A, B, and C consist
of sub-areas. Group A, Critical Areas, encompasses process areas such as hazardous
chemical storage, other areas that are covered by OSHA PSM, petroleum bulk storage,
tank farms, control rooms, main power distribution control board rooms, central fire
extinguishing systems, and similar facilities. Utility Areas provide the facilities for the
process to take place, and failure in one of these areas will cause uncontrolled shutdown.
These areas include facilities such as power plants, cooling towers, and air plants.
Associated sub-areas include facilities where failure in their operation have no
significant effect on the safe operation of the plant, or at least it will allow a safe
shutdown. These include wide range of areas such as laboratories, conveyors, and central
office buildings. Figure 2-4 demonstrates the hierarchy of the Scope of Program
criterion.
The estimations and relative importance of the groups are shown in Matrix 2-14
and in Table 2-3 respectively:
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Figure 2-4. Hierarchy of the scope of program criterion
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Table 2-3. Relative weights and C.R. of the scope of work set of criteria
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Critical sub Areas 0.457
Utility sub Areas 0.202
Associated sub Areas 0.120
Organizational Changes 0.221
C.R.= 0.02
Critical Sub-areas
As previously explained, critical areas encompass process areas such as
hazardous chemical storage, areas that are covered by OSHA PSM, and others. Matrix 2-
15 consists of the estimations and table 2-4 consists of the relative weights and the C.R.:
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Table 2-4. Relative weights and C.R. of the critical sub-area set of elements
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
OSHA PSM Areas 0.357
Atmospheric Tank Farm 0.110
Control Room 0.230
Process Safety Protection Systems 0.303
C.R.= 0.02
Utility Sub-areas
Utility sub-areas are areas that support the processes and the plant. An undesired
event that will cause deviation from the normal operation conditions of these areas will
lead to unsafe conditions in the plant. The following sub groups are included in the
Utility sub-areas category:
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• Facilities such as cooling towers
• Power plant (including steam system)
• Nitrogen supply and regulating system
• Air plant
Matrix 2-16 consists of estimations of the Utility sub-areas, and table 2-5
presents the relative weights and the C. R.:
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Table 2-5. Relative weights and C.R. of the utility sub-area set of elements
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Facilities such as Cooling Towers 0.165
Power plant (including steam system) 0.392
Nitrogen supply and regulating system 0.279
Air Plant 0.165
C.R.= 0.02
Associated Sub-areas
Associated sub-areas are areas that supply different services to the plant.
Interruption in the operation of these areas will not cause interruption to the safe
operation of the plant. The associated sub-areas consists of four major sub-areas:
• Laboratories
• Service facilities such as Rail Car Wash
• Facilities such as conveyors, and central maintenance areas.
• Central administrative areas (human resources changes are not included)
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Matrix 2-17 and Table 2-6 consist of the estimations and the relative weights of
the associated sub-areas, respectively:
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Table 2-6: Relative weights and C.R. of the associated set of sub-area set of elements
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Laboratories 0.346
Service facilities such as Rail Car
Wash
0.246
Facilities such as conveyors, and
central maintenance area.
0.204
Central administrative areas 0.204
C.R.= 0.02
Training MOC
General
There are many methods for evaluating the effectiveness of a training program.
This methods consist of two components: (1) quality and appropriateness of the content,
and (2) proper implementation of the program. Elaborate methods have been developed
to address the quality and appropriateness of a training program content [27]. However,
all of these methods consist of elements that violate the guidelines of this study. Other
methods attempt to establish correlation and a statistical relationship between accident
rates and training effectiveness [28]. However, a low rate of events and poor accident
data jeopardize the validity of the results.
The scope of performance measurements of a MOC training program in this
study is limited to verification that the program consists of three types of training and
that the appropriate employees will be subjected to a suitable training. Curves that
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measure the appropriateness of the frequency of training will be developed later in this
chapter under the Outcome criterion.
Figure 2-5 emphasizes the three dimensions in performance measurements of a
MOC training program:
• Topic addressed by the program. A MOC training program is expected to consist
of the following elements:
1. Formal awareness training
2. Procedure updates
3. Information transfer practices (e.g. informing new shift on activities that
involves MOC during the previous shift, such as notes with regard to
night work orders in the logbook, review of logbook when returning from
vacation, etc.)
• Type of employees that are subjected to training. It is possible to divide plant
employees into several groups and for this study employees are divided into three
groups as follows:
1. Administrative employees
2. Field operation employees (including maintenance, operators,
operation management, engineering, technical staff, and purchasing)
3. Contractors
• Frequency of training; OSHA PSM requires that training will be conducted at
least once every three years. Even though higher training frequency will yield
better results, especially in the introductory phase of the program. Therefore,
frequency of training will be a function of the program maturity. However, the
appropriateness of the training frequency will be considered later.
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Figure 2-6 demonstrates the hierarchy of the training component. The estimations
and relative effects that awareness training, procedure updates, and information transfer
have on the quality of the training are shown in Matrix 2-18 and in Table 2-7,
respectively.
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Table 2-7. Relative weights and C.R. of the training set of sub-criteria
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Awareness Training 0.500
Procedure Update 0.250
Information Transfer 0.250
C.R.= 0.00
Topics Addressed by
Training Program
Groups of Employees that
are subjected to Training
Frequency of Training
Measurement
Process
Input
Performance
Evaluation
Figure 2-5. Training program performance evaluation process
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Awareness Training
Matrix 2-19 includes estimations for the importance of training for each of the
three employee groups. The relative importance values and the C.R. of the three type of
training are presented in Table 2-8:
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MOC PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
Scope of
Program
Authorization MOC
Training
Audit Hazard
Identification
Outcomes
Awareness
Training
Procedure
Updates
Information
Transfer
Field Operation
Employees
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Employees
Administrative
Employees
Figure 2-6. Hierarchy of the MOC training criterion
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Table 2-8. Relative weights and C.R. of the training groups of employees in awareness training
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Field Operation Employees 0.525
Contractor Employees 0.334
Administrative Employees 0.142
C.R.= 0.05
Procedure Updates and Information Transfer
Only two of the employee groups are exposed to procedure updates and
information transfer. Table 2-9 summarizes the relative importance of procedure
updates and information transfer with regard to training for field operation employees
and contractor employees.
Table 2-9. Relative weights of training groups of employees in procedure updates and information transfer
Criterion Relative Weight
iw with Regard to
Procedure Updates
Relative Weight
iw with Regard to
Information
Transfer
Field Operation Employees 0.667 0.667
Contractor Employees 0.333 0.333
Hazard Identification
General
The main purpose of the Management of Change program is to verify that safety
aspects are addressed appropriately in the design and implementation of changes. MOC
program hazard detection capabilities are dependent on the methods that are “offered”
by the program (risk screening capabilities). Moreover, these capabilities depend on
training to identifying the need for implementation of such techniques (Awareness
Training) as well. Figure 2-7 demonstrates the hierarchy of the Hazard Identification
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criterion. The risk screening capabilities element consists of four major group
techniques:
• Safety review
• Checklist, What-if, What-if/Checklist
• Advanced Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) techniques, such as HAZOP,
FMEA, FTA, ETA.
• Human reliability analysis techniques
MOC PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
Scope of
Program
Authorization MOC
Training
Audit Hazard
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Outcomes
Risk
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Safety
Review
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What if/Checklist
Advanced
PHA
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Figure 2-7. Hierarchy of the hazard identification criterion
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Table 2-10. Relative weights and C.R. of the hazard identification set of sub criteria
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Awareness Training 0.500
Risk Screening 0.500
Table 2-10 lists the relative weights of Awareness Training and Risk Screening,
with respect to the Hazard Identification Criterion.
Risk Screening
The estimations and the relative importance of employing each group of Risk
Screening techniques is presented in Matrix 2-20 and in Table 2-11, respectively.
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Table 2-11. Relative weights and C.R. of the risk screening set of elements
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Safety Review 0.216
Checklist, What-if, What-is/Checklist 0.321
Advanced PHA Techniques 0.349
Human Reliability Analysis Techniques 0.114
C.R.= 0.03
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Outcomes
General
“Outcomes” is a complicated criterion. Unlike the other criteria, the outcomes
criterion measures the results of MOC program implementation. As Figure 2-8 reveals
3
,
this criterion consists of six elements, which are analyzed according to three sub-criteria.
Although the relative effects on the performance of each element are being developed in
this study, further work is required to quantify each of the elements in this criterion. The
Outcomes criterion consists of the following sub-criteria:
• Hazard identification failures: This sub-criterion represents elements that are
relevant to hazard identification failures.
• Authorization failures: The Authorization sub-criterion represents the relative
effects of MOC work orders for which the authorization process was not
completed appropriately on the performance of the Outcomes criterion.
• Classification failures: The classification failure criterion represents the effect of
the Maintenance Work Orders that should have been identified as MOCs but
were miss-classified on the performance of the outcomes criterion.
Information with regard to the six elements is collected during the audit process.
The following information is required for the measurement:
• Number of MWOs that were not classified as regular MOCs – [MWO-MOC
miss-classifications element]
• Number of MWOs that were not classified as Temporary MOCs - [Failure to
Apply Temporary MOCs element]
3
Gray boxes and gray dashed lines in hierarchies emphasizes that the criteria/sub-criteria/elements are
mutually dependent on other criteria/sub-criteria/elements that are not playing direct role in the actual
discussion. AHP is not limited to linear pattern of thinking, and is considering mutual dependencies.
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• Number of MWOs that were not classified as Emergency MOCs (Failure to
Apply Emergency MOCs element)
• Number of MOC work orders for which the authorization process was not
completed appropriately (Failure to Appropriately Authorize element)
• Number of improper hazard evaluation technique applications (Failure to Apply
Appropriate Hazard Evaluation Techniques element)
The estimations and the weights of the Outcomes sub criteria are presented in
Matrix 2-21 and in Table 2-12, respectively:
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Table 2-12. Relative weights and C.R. of the outcomes sub-criteria
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
Classification Failure 0.321
Authorization Failures 0.225
Hazard Detection Failures 0.454
C.R.= 0.12
The inconsistency ratio of 0.12 requires re-evaluation. To verify that this
inconsistency ratio value was not due to inconsistency of judgment, the matrix of
comparison was recalculated. However, the resulting values in the matrix were the
estimations before rounding them to fit the AHP scale. The inconsistency value when
calculated as described above was 0.07. Therefore there was no need to re-evaluate the
judgment.
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Classification Failures
As Figure 2-8 demonstrates, the Classification Failures sub-criterion is affected
by the following:
• MWO-MOC misclassifications
• Failure to apply temporary MOCs
• Failure to apply emergency MOCs
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Matrix 2-22 presents the estimations and Table 2-13 presents the relative weights
and C.R.:
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Table 2-13. Relative weights and C.R. of the classification failures set of elements
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
MWO-MOC Misclassifications 0.333
Failure to Apply Temporary MOCs 0.333
Failure to Apply Emergency MOCs 0.333
C.R.= 0.00
Authorization Failures
Failure to deliver any MOC work order through the MOC path is by definition an
authorization failure. Another type of failure is MOC work orders that are tunneled
through the MOC program path, but the authorization process was not completed
appropriately. The elements that affect the authorization failures are as follows:
• MWO-MOC misclassifications
• Failure to apply temporary MOCs
• Failure to apply Emergency MOCs
• Failure to authorize appropriately
Matrix 2-23 presents of the estimations. The relative weights and the C.R. are
listed in Table 2-14:
37













−
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2111
2111
2111
AuthorizeelyAppropriattoFailure
MOCsEmergencyapplytoFailure
MOCsTemporaryapplytoFailure
icationsmisclassifMOCMWO
(2-23)
Table 2-14. Relative weights and C.R. of the authorization failure set of elements
Criterion Relative Weight
iw
MWO-MOC misclassifications 0.286
Failure to apply temporary MOCs 0. 286
Failure to apply Emergency MOCs 0. 286
Failure to appropriately authorize 0.143
C.R.= 0.00
Hazard Detection Failures
As Figure 2-8 demonstrates, the Hazard Detection Failures criterion is affected
by all six elements. The estimations are presented in Matrix 2-24, and the relative
weights and C.R. are presented in Table 2-15:
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Table 2-15. Relative weights and C.R. of the hazard identification failures set of elements
Criterion Relative
Weight
Failure to Properly Train 0.306
MWO-MOC Misclassifications 0.168
Failures to Apply Temporary MOC 0.180
Failures to Apply Emergency MOC 0.162
Failure to Appropriately Authorize 0.070
Failure to Apply Appropriate Hazard Evaluation
Techniques
0.113
C.R.= 0.01
Audit
The audit process consists of several components [29]. The hierarchy in Figure
2-9 presents the elements that affect the safety performance of the program. The Audit
criterion consists of two sub-criteria: (1) the content that the Audit procedure addresses;
and (2) appropriateness of the audit frequency. As for appropriate audit frequency, a
curve that considered both the audit frequency as well as the program maturity is
developed separately below in this chapter. Table 2-16 presents the relative importance
of audit frequency and the content sub-criteria:
Table 2-16. Relative weights of the audit set of sub-criteria
Criterion Relative Weight
Content of Audit 0.75
Appropriate Audit Frequency 0.25
Matrix 2-25 and Table 2-17 presents the estimations and the relative weights and
C.R. of the Audit Content set of elements, respectively:
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Figure 2-9. Hierarchy of the audit criterion
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Table 2-17. Relative weights and C.R. of the content of audit set of elements
Criterion Relative Weight
Implementation of MOC Training 0.223
Misclassification of MOCs 0.173
Temporary MOCs 0.159
Emergency MOCs 0.159
Authorizations 0.127
Hazard Evaluations 0.159
C.R.= 0.03
Authorization
Several criteria affect the level of MOC authorization. Among these criteria are
the financial resources that are required to implement the change, which include human
resources requirements. The authorization process integrates these factors. However, the
focus of this study is on the effects on the safety performance of the program. Figure 2-
10 demostrates the hierarchy of the Authorization criterion with respect to regular
MOCs, temporary MOCs, and emergency MOCs, and the positons that are available for
the authorization of each type of MOC. Matrix 2-26 presents the relative importance of
MOC authorization, and Table 2-18 presents the relative weights with respect to the
authorization process.
Table 2-18. Relative weights and C.R. of authorization set of sub-criteria
Criterion Relative Weight
Regular MOC 0.333
Temporary MOCs 0.333
Emergency MOCs 0.333
C.R.= 0.00
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The estimations of the relative importance of Regular MOCs, Temporary MOC,
and Emergency MOC authorization by the various positions in the plant are presented in
Matrixes 2-27, 2-28, and 2-29, respectively:
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Table 2-19 sumarizes the relative importance of the three types of MOC
authorizations by the positions in the plant.
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Figure 2-10. Hierarchy of the authorization criterion
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Table 2-19. Relative weights and C.R. of the authorization set of elements
Criterion Regular
MOC
Temporary
MOC
Emergency
MOC
MOC Coordinator 0.107 0.179 0.179
Operation Manager and/
or Maintenance Manager
0.357 0.291 0.291
Plant Manager 0.137 0.132 0.133
EH&S Officer 0.179 0.140 0.164
Engineering/
Instrumentation
0.163 0.207 0.184
Executives 0.057 0.051 0.049
C.R.Reg. 0.00
C.R.Temp= 0.00
C.R.Emerg. = 0.00
where,
C.R.Reg. is the consistency ratio in weighting regular MOCs
C.R.Temp. is the consistency ratio in weighting temporary MOCs
C.R.Emerg. is the consistency ratio in weighting emergency MOCs
Outcome Curves
General
Pairwise comparison questions were used to establish outcome curves of training
and audit frequencies, as well as to reveal relative weights. The experts were asked to
estimate the appropriateness of several frequencies of training and auditing (e.g., how
much more effective is training policy of once in two years in the third year after
launching MOC program than the policy of once in three years?). The estimations were
normalized by dividing each of the estimations by the maximum value in its level of
maturity. Using the regression models available in Microsoft Excel™ the values were
adapted in both dimensions: (1) along the frequencies for each maturity level; and (2)
along the maturity levels for each of the frequencies. Finally, the functions of the best-fit
curves were calculated.
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Training Frequency
The appropriate training frequency is a function of the maturity of the MOC
program. It is expected that immature programs (programs that were launched in a
period of less than five years) will require more frequent training than mature programs.
The relative importance of the various types of training has been addressed previously
with regard to the population that is being trained. Because of their nature, procedure
updates and practices of information transfer training, unlike awareness training, cannot
be formally scheduled. Figure 2-11 presents the awareness training performance curves
as a function of training frequency and maturity of the MOC program:
The functions of the curves for each level of maturity are listed in Appendix A. As
Figure 2-11 reveals, the higher the frequency of awareness training, the higher the
performance level.
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Figure 2-11. Awareness training frequency performance curves
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Audit Frequency
As with training policy, appropriate frequency of internal audit process is a
function of the maturity of the MOC program. The launch of a new program, a new
corporate ownership, and recovery from an impropriety program require rapid auditing
to identify flaws as early as possible. The Audit Frequency performance curves, are
presented in Figure 2-12, revealed an interesting finding. Audit frequency of less than
once in 6 months was found to be less appropriate than the frequency of once in 6
months for maturity levels of 4 years and less, and audit frequency of less than once in
12 months was found to be less appropriate than the frequency of once in 12 months for
a maturity level of 5 and more years. The audit process is intensive. It requires
significant resources, and it commands the attention and time of operation employees
during their shift time. The behavior of the curves in the range of less than 12 months for
the 5 years maturity level, and the behavior of the curves in the range of less than 6 
months for the other levels of maturity, may express the concern of the experts from the
effects of high audit frequency on the system.
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Figure 2-12. Audit frequency performance curves
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A facility that employs a policy of audit frequency that is shorter than the
minimum that is required to gain maximum performance credit, may waste resources
and efforts. However, in the domain of process safety performance of the audit
frequency, the facility should be scored maximally. Therefore, Figure 2-12 was modified
to address this change. The modified curves are presented in Figure 2-13.
Sensitivity Analysis
The Concept
Sensitivity analysis is extremely important when the decision making process is
used for selecting from a set of alternatives. If the sensitivity analysis reveals that a small
change in the weight of a criterion will change the alternative previously selected, then
the decision maker should focus on the weight assignments to ensure that the best
alternative is selected. In applications of decision-making for ranking purposes, the
importance of a sensitivity analysis is minor and may have an insignificant impact. In a
study such as has been conducted in this work, change in rank will cause insignificant
change in the scores.
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The majority of elements in this model are connected to the overall goal through
a single path. However, in the Outcome criterion, the elements are connected to the
overall goal through the Audit branch too. Therefore, it is hard to predict how changes in
the weights of the criteria will affect the ranking of its elements.
The expression for the minimal change in criteria weights that is required to reverse the
selection of the most preferred alternative is available in the literature. The following is a
generalization of this expression to calculate the minimal change in criteria weights that
is required to reverse the rank of any alternative, and a thorough analysis on the audit
branch.
Most Critical Criterion
The most critical criterion can be defined in two ways: (1) the criterion that the
smallest change in its weight wj will cause replacement only of the best top alternative;
(2) the criterion that the smallest change in its weight wj will cause change of rank of
any of the alternatives. The first definition is of interest for the processes of selecting the
best alternative. However, in decision making methods for evaluation of performance
measurements, as is applied in this study, the second definition is of an interest.
The changes in criterion weight can be measured absolutely or relatively (to the
value of the weight). Sensitivity analysis may reveal different results when the analysis
aims for the smallest absolute change compared to an analysis that aims for the smallest
relative change. The smallest absolute change has rarely been studied [30], mainly
because this information is useless if it is not compared to the original value, which then
turns to be a relative change. The search for the most critical criterion in this study is in
the relative change domain.
Several other definitions are required for the study: Ai is the i alternative from a
set of m alternatives. For the purpose of this study, the alternatives are ranked in a
descending order, i.e., alternative A1 is the most important alternative with a final
preference value (the final value of the weight with respect to the overall goal) of P1.
Hence, the following relation is satisfied P1•P2•….•Pm.
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Cj is criterion j (from a set of n criteria) with a weight wj. Let
/
jw  be the new weight that
will cause a change in the ranking of the alternatives. Now the absolute change in the
weight of criterion Cj will be as follows:
/
jj ww − (2-30)
The following is an expression for the relative change:
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j
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w
ww
(2-31)
Let j,i,kδ (for 1 =< i =< j =< m and 1 =< k =< n) denote the minimum change in
the current weight wk of criterion Ck such that the ranking of alternatives Ai and Aj are
reversed. The relative change
/
j,i,kδ can be expressed as follows:
100
,,/
,, •=
k
jik
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δ
δ (2-32)
The criteria weights, when using AHP, are normalized and add to unity.
Therefore, introduction of a new weight for one criterion to reverse the rank o f
alternatives Ai and Aj will affect the other weights. The new weight of criterion Ck is as
follows:
jikkk ww ,,δ−=
∗
(2-33)
The expression 2-34 presents the new normalized weights:
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The interest here concerns the question “What is the change in the weight of
criterion CK so that the final preferences
/
iP and
/
jP  of alternatives Ai and Aj will be
reversed and the expression in   2-35 will be valid”?:
/
jP >
/
iP (2-35)
Let aiR denote the preference of alternative Ai with respect to criterion CR , and
ajR the preference of alternative Aj with respect to criterion CR. When using AHP the
expression for the final preference is as follows:
jR
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1
// (2-36)
Substituting expression 2-36 into 2-35 yield the following:
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// (2-37)
Substituting the expression for the new weights into the expression in 2-37 will
give the following:
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The denominator is common and is positive. Therefore, expression 2-38 can be
reduced as follows:
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Substituting expression 2-33 into 2-39 yields the following:
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Rearranging the components in the expression in 2-40 will produce the
expression in    2-41:
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expression 2-41 is reduced to the following:
jjKKijiiKKij PaPa +−<+− δδ (2-42)
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Rearranging the components and isolating Kijδ will yield an expression for the
change in the weight of criterion K to reverse the preferences of alternatives Ai and Aj:
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )ikjk
ikjk
ij
Kij
ikjk
ikjk
ij
Kij
aaif
aa
PP
oraaif
aa
PP
<
−
−
>
>
−
−
<
δ
δ ;
(2-43)
The expression for the relative change is as follows:
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Since the maximum change that can be applied to the weight wk of criterion Ck is
as large as wk, it is possible to test if such a change is feasible as follows:
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(2-45)
If this condition is not fulfilled then the change
/
Kijδ is infeasible. Two major conclusions
result from 2-44 and 2-45 are:
1. If alternative Ai dominates alternative Aj (i.e., the preference of alternative Ai is
higher than the preference of alternative Aj in each of the criteria) then it is
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impossible to make alternative Aj more preferred by applying changes to the
weights of the criteria.
2. Criterion Ck is considered a robust criterion if all quantities
/
Kijδ are infeasible.
Sensitivity Analysis of the Outcome Branch
The elements in Figure 2-8 are connected to the overall goal through four sub-
criteria and two criteria. The following notation will be used for the purposes of this
analysis:
C1 - The Outcome criterion
1
1C - The Classification Failures sub-criterion
2
1C - The Authorization Failures sub-criterion
3
1C - The Hazard Detection Failures sub-criterion
C2 - the Audit criterion
1
2C - The Audit Content sub-criterion
A1 - The Failure to Train Properly element
A2 - The MWO-MOC misclassification element
A3 - The Failure to Apply Temporary MOCs element
A4 - The Failure to Apply Emergency MOCs element
A5 - The Failure to Authorize Appropriately element
A6 - The Failure to Apply Appropriate Hazard Detection Techniques element
Table 2-20 summarizes the preferences of the elements with respect to the
various criteria, sub-criteria, and the overall goal.
There are 90 combinations of
/
Kijδ for a system of 6 alternatives and 6 criteria.
However alternatives A1, A5, and A6 are not connected to all of the criteria, and
therefore only 69 combinations were calculated.
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Table 2-20. Preferences of the outcome elements with respect to the various criteria
Elements 1
1C
2
1C
3
1C C1
1
2C C2 Pi
A1 N/A N/A 0.306 0.107 0.023 0.017 0.020
A2 0.333 0.286 0.168 0.247 0.173 0.130 0.054
A3 0.333 0.286 0.180 0.253 0.159 0.119 0.054
A4 0.333 0.286 0.162 0.245 0.159 0.119 0.054
A5 N/A 0.143 0.070 0.064 0.127 0.095 0.018
A6 N/A N/A 0.113 0.051 0.159 0.119 0.019
The most critical criterion was found to be the Hazard Detection Failures. A
reduction of 6.14% of its weight reversed the rank of Element A1 with Element A6.
Since the final preferences of alternatives A1, A2, and A6 are very close to each other, the
changes in the criteria weights to cause different rank is not large, especially for criteria
with initial low weight.
Summary
By defining the hierarchy of the Management of Change elements, it was
possible to apply a Multi Criteria Decision Making method (MCDM) to reveal the
relative weights of the MOC components. However, most MCDM methods encounter
problems when interdependencies exist among the components. Therefore, the AHP was
selected to analyze this problem, because this method works well with interdependencies
and it measures the consistency in assignment of weights. A questionnaire survey of 179
questions sent to several experts revealed weights of the criteria and elements of the
model. The results were analyzed by AHP, and the judgment of the experts was
determined to be consistent. Only a single matrix has a Consistency Index value of 0.12
that was found to be high because of rounding values to fit to the AHP scale and not
because of inconsistency among the experts.
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Sensitivity analysis has a minor importance when MCDM is applied for
measurements of effects and not for selecting from a set of alternatives. However, an
expression was developed for the minimum change that is required to reverse the
preferences of any element, and sensitivity analysis was conducted for the branch that
does not consist of robust criteria. The analysis revealed that Hazard Detection Failures
is the critical criterion. A reduction of 6.14% of its weight reversed the rank of element
A1 with element A6. However, since the final preferences of alternatives A1, A2, and A6
are nearly the same, the changes in the weights of criteria that are required to reverse
preferences is not large, especially with criteria of initial low weight.
The curves of training frequency performance and audit frequency performance
were developed too. The development of the audit frequency curves revealed an
interesting conclusion: An audit frequency of less than 1 in 6 months was found to be
less appropriate than the frequency of 1 in 6 months for a maturity level of 4 years and
less. An audit frequency of less than 1 in 12 months was found to be less appropriate
than the frequency of 1 in 12 months for a maturity level of 5 and more years. The
assumption is that the behavior of these curves may express the concern of the experts
about effects of imposing too frequent audits on the system.
The results were consolidated to a form that is useful for performance
measurements of Management of Change programs. This form is presented in Appendix
B.
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CHAPTER III
BENCHMARKING OF PROCESS SAFETY ELEMENTS AMONG FACILITIES
*
General
Chemical, oil, and gas plants process many potentially hazardous chemicals.
Historically, a variety of measures have been used for hazard reduction and risk
management. During the last decade, federal regulations have been promulgated in the
United States mandating process safety management standards. OSHA’s P rocess Safety
Management (PSM) and the EPA’s R isk Management Program (RMP) regulations
provide the baselines and framework for development of programs and procedures in the
industry. Due to the performance-based nature of these regulatory requirements, there is
wide variation in these programs and practices. This chapter summarizes the results of
benchmarking exercises aimed at identifying the diversity of implementation practices of
MOC and Emergency Preparedness and Response programs. A questionnaire for
benchmarking of Process Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) procedures in industry is
also developed.
Benchmarking of Management of Change Practices in the Process Industries
Background
Changes and modifications in chemical plants are essential for survival in the
dynamic process industry. These changes and modifications are needed for a variety of
reasons, such as yield improvement, compensation for unavailable equipment,
production increases, increases in storage capacity, cost reduction, safety improvements,
and pollution prevention. The process changes usually involve changes in operating
procedures - changes in piping, equipment, or materials of construction - as well as
*
Portions of this chapter are reproduced with permission of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
Copyright © 2002 AIChE. All rights reserved.
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changes in feedstocks, catalysts, fuels, or their method of delivery. However, a number
of catastrophic incidents have been attributed to improperly handled process changes
[25,31,32,33,34]. OSHA’s PSM regulation [35] and EPA’s RMP regulation [36] both
require regulated facilities to develop and implement MOC programs. Both the
regulations are similar and performance-based. The MOC requirements as specified in
the OSHA’s PSM regulation are produced below in its entirety in Table 3-1
4
. The
performance-based nature of the MOC element is apparent from a reading of the
regulatory requirements shown in Table 3-1. Practices often vary [37, 38] and there is a
critical need to determine the industry consensus or Recognized and Generally Accepted
Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).
Table 3-1. Management of change requirements – OSHA PSM regulation
4
The MOC requirements of the EPA RMP regulation are similar to the OSHA PSM requirements.
29 CFR 1910.119(l) Management of change.
(l)(1)The employer shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes
(except for "replacements in kind") to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and
procedures; and, changes to facilities that affect a covered process.
(l)(2)The procedures shall assure that the following considerations are addressed prior to any
change:
(l)(2)(i) The technical basis for the proposed change;
(l)(2)(ii) Impact of change on safety and health;
(l)(2)(iii) Modifications to operating procedures;
(l)(2)(iv) Necessary time period for the change; and,
(l)(2)(v) Authorization requirements for the proposed change.
(l)(3) Employees involved in operating a process and maintenance and contract employees
whose job tasks will be affected by a change in the process shall be informed of, and trained in,
the change prior to start-up of the process or affected part of the process.
(l)(4) If a change covered by this paragraph results in a change in the process safety
information required by paragraph (d) of this section, such information shall be updated
accordingly.
(l)(5) If a change covered by this paragraph results in a change in the operating procedures or
practices required by paragraph (f) of this section, such procedures or practices shall be
updated accordingly.
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This is true not only in the case of management of change but also in the case of
other elements of the process safety management program. This effort is thus aimed at
developing a benchmark of industry practices for different process safety management
requirements. Management of change because of the wide variation in application is the
first element chosen for analysis. The benchmarking exercises should be repeated on the
same elements (e.g., management of change) as practices change. It is important to note
that with new technologies and other advances, RAGAGEP will remain a moving target
with the need for continual benchmarking and determination of RAGAGEP as they
apply to the current time-frame. The MOC benchmarking represented in this chapter was
conducted during the months March and April of 2001. A questionnaire was prepared
and distributed to more than 50 plants, out of which 27 facilities responded. The
questionnaire is reproduced in its entirety in Table 3-2. The plants surveyed had 100 to
1000 employees. Figure 3-1 shows the distribution of facilities based on the number of
employees. The facilities averaged between 6-15 separate process areas, however, one
facility had 72 processes. The industries represented consisted of chemicals, refineries,
petrochemicals, and gas plants.
Figure 3-1. Distribution of facilities based on number of employees
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Table 3-2. Questionnaire for benchmarking management of change
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Management of Change (MOC) is a relatively recent procedure that was mandated by the OSHA Process
Safety Management regulation. The objective of the questions contained herein is to identify the diversity
of MOC application within the chemical processing industry. A copy of the report resulting from this
project will be provided to all the participants.
This benchmarking questionnaire is targeted towards 24-hour continuous operation single site facilities.
Please return the questionnaire with appropriate notations if these assumptions are not correct.
1 Facility Size and Type
1.1. How many employees (including contractors) work at this site? For uniformity, include
everyone on the payroll, including the administrative and contract personnel.
________________________________________________________________
1.2. How many separate process areas are within the plant complex?
__________________________________________________________________
1.3. Which of the following best characterizes the process operations at this site? (Check only one)
pi Chemical
pi Refining
pi Petrochemical
pi Pharmaceutical
pi Food
pi Gas Plant
pi Other (please specify__________________________________)
2 Scope
2.1. Is MOC applied plant-wide or only for regulatory “covered” proces s areas? (Check only
one)
pi Plant-wide
pi Regulatory “covered”process areas
2.2. Is MOC applied to atmospheric tank farm areas? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
2.3. Is MOC applied to utilities, such as steam generation or waste-water treatment areas?
(Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
2.4. Are there any process areas within your plant that are NOT subjected to formal MOC
procedures? (Check only one)
pi Yes Describe_______________________________________
pi No
3 Policy Development
3.1. Was the MOC policy and procedures developed by corporate staff and then introduced to each
plant? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
3.2. Was the MOC policy and procedures developed by local plant staff? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
3.3. Were PSM consultants used to initially develop MOC policy and procedures? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
3.4. Are MOC procedures consistent plant-wide or vary somewhat within each area of the plant?
(Check only one)
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Table 3-2. (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
pi Consistent plant-wide
pi Vary somewhat within each area of the plant
3.5. Is there any effort to maintain consistent MOC procedures with other plants within the
corporation? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
4 Size of MOC program
4.1. How many maintenance work orders (replacement-in-kind) are initiated annually?
_______________________________________________________
4.2. How many MOCs (all MOCs including emergency and temporary MOCs) are initiated
annually
1
?
_______________________________________________________
4.3. Do you keep records of MOCs that are not approved? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
4.3.1. If answer to 4.3 is yes, how many MOCs were eventually not approved?
___________________________________________________
5. Emergency MOCs
5.1. How many emergency MOCs are initiated annually
1
?
_______________________________________________________
5.2. Who approves emergency MOCs?
_______________________________________________________
5.3. How long does it take to get approval of an emergency MOC?
_______________________________________________________
5.4. Are emergency MOCs audited/checked as soon as practicable? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
How many emergency MOCs require remedial actions or violate the company/site MOC
procedures?
6. Temporary MOCs
6.1. How many temporary MOCs are initiated annually
1
?
_______________________________________________________
6.2. Who checks to see if the changes affected by the temporary MOCs are restored to their normal
conditions after the expiration of the authorized time period?
_______________________________________________________
6.3. Are temporary MOCs audited/checked as soon as practicable do determine if the change has
been restored to the original condition? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
7. MOC records management
7.1. Are MOC files maintained in a plant central records storage area or within each respective plant
area? (Check only one)
pi Plant central records storage area
pi Within each respective plant area
7.2. Are MOC files maintained electronically or does a paper copy exist? (Check only one)
pi MOC files maintained electronically
pi Paper copy
pi Both
7.3. Who is responsible for maintaining MOC files? (Check only one)
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Table 3-2. (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
pi Safety
pi Operations
pi Maintenance
pi Other_____________________
8. Audit
8.1. Have there been additional audits of the MOC program beyond the standard required 3-year
PSM audit? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
8.2. Is the PSM Audit conducted by corporate staff not normally located at the plant? (Check only
one)
pi Yes
pi No
8.3. Were outside consultants involved in the Audit? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
9. Audit Results
9.1. Did the Audit reveal any MOCs were mis-classified? (Check only one)
pi Yes (if possible indicate approx % of MOCs audited which had issue _____%)
pi No
9.2. Did the Audit reveal any field changes that were not subjected to MOC procedures? (Check only
one)
pi Yes (if possible indicate approx % of MOCs audited which had issue _____%)
pi No
9.3. Did the Audit reveal any maintenance work orders that should have been classified as MOCs?
(Check only one)
pi Yes (if possible indicate approx % of MOCs audited which had issue _____%)
pi No
9.4. Were there any recommendations for upgrading your MOC program from the latest audit?
(Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
9.4.1. If so, what were these recommendations?
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
10. MOC software
10.1. Do you use any special software to facilitate the MOC procedure? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
10.2. Was this software developed in-house? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
10.3. If commercial software is used, is it satisfactory? (Check only one)
pi Yes (List name of software used________________________)
pi No
11. MOC Program Awareness Training
11.1. How are new employees and contractor employees made aware of the MOC policy and
procedures? (Check all that apply)
pi Formal training classes
pi Provided with policy manual
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Table 3-2. (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
pi Informal toolbox safety meetings
pi Other________________________
11.2. If training classes are provided, how often are classes scheduled?
_____________________________________________
11.3. Is MOC training separate from PSM program awareness training? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
11.4. Is a video describing the need for MOC used within your MOC awareness training program
(such as the video available from Roy Sanders of Lake Charles)? (Check only one)
pi Yes (List name of material used__________________________)
pi No
12. Impact on Risk Management Plan
Section 68.36(b) of the EPA RMP regulation states
“If changes in processes, quantities stored or handled, or any other aspect of the stationary source
might reasonably be expected to increase or decrease the distance to the endpoint by a factor of
two or more, the owner or operator shall complete a revised analysis within six months of the
change and submit a revised risk management plan….”
12.1. Who is responsible for checking changes requiring an MOC for impact on the RMP plan?
(Check only one)
pi Safety
pi Environmental
pi Corporate Specialist
pi Other_____________________
12.2. Have any change requiring an MOC ever caused an RMP update?
_____________________________________________
13. MOC initiation
13.1. Do all work orders require a corresponding MOC authorization number or explanation “why
MOC is not required”? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
13.2. Who is responsible for identifying a work order is NOT a replacement–in–kind, and is therefore
work that requires an MOC? (Check only one)
pi Safety
pi Operations
pi Maintenance
pi Other_____________________
13.3 Are DCS software changes documented using the MOC procedure? (Check only
one)
pi Yes
pi No
13.3.1 If so, who maintains the DCS software change documentation (Check only one)
pi Operations
pi Engineering (DCS specialists)
pi Other (provide function name ___________)
14. PHA revalidation
14.1. What criteria are used to determine whether or not a PHA must be performed with an MOC?
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
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Table 3-2. (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
14.2. Do PHA’s performed for MOCs vary in the degree of detailed review and documentation (If yes,
please explain)?
pi Yes (__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________)
pi No
14.3. Did the PHA revalidation team review MOC records? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
14.4. Did the PHA revalidation team find any changes that were not identified in the MOC records?
(Check only one)
pi Yes (if possible indicate approx % of MOCs audited which had issue _____%)
pi No
15. Environmental and Quality
15.1. Are environmental staff consulted as part of the MOC review? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
15.2. Is the plant accredited under ISO 9000? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
15.3. Is the PSM MOC program consolidated with the Quality configuration management program?
(Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
15.3.1. If so, are records consolidated? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
16. Risk Screening or Ranking MOC
(The following group of questions is based upon the concept that proposed MOCs should be screened in
order to provide the appropriate resources to evaluate the impact on safety of the proposed change.)
16.1. Does your site use Risk Screening or Ranking of MOCs?
pi Yes
pi No
16.2. Who developed the risk screening procedure?
pi Yes
pi Local in-house staff
pi Corporate PSM staff
pi Outside consultants
pi Other______________
16.3. Who conducts the risk screening? (Check only one)
pi MOC initiator
pi MOC Coordinator
16.4. How many risk categories are available?
______________________________________________________
16.5. Are potential consequences and potential event frequency evaluated separately in the
determination of the appropriate risk category? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
16.5.1 if yes, how is potential consequences and potential event frequency evaluated?
(Check only one)
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Table 3-2. (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
pi Checklists
pi Staff experience only
17. Safety Review of MOC
17.1. If risk screening is used, are different safety review techniques applicable to each MOC risk
category? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
17.2. Are checklists available for low risk MOC? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
17.3. Are high-risk MOC categories evaluated within the plant or required to be submitted to
corporate safety staff? (Check only one)
pi Evaluated within the plant
pi Submitted to corporate safety staff
18. Authorization
18.1. How many authorizations are required on a MOC request to proceed with the change?
_________________________________________________________
18.2. If risk screening is used, are different authorization levels applicable to each MOC risk
category? (Such as authorization at the process unit area or plant manager level.) (Check only
one)
pi Yes
pi No
18.3. If risk screening is used, are different number of authorizations applicable to each MOC risk
category? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
19. Training in the MOC
19.1. Who is responsible for conducting training regarding the impact of the MOC? (Check only one)
pi MOC coordinator
pi Operations
pi Training department
pi Other (list function _______________________________)
19.2. If risk screening is used, are different types of training requirements applicable to each MOC
risk categories? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
19.3. Are night orders or logbook notation used for informing staff of low risk MOC changes? (Check
only one)
pi Yes
pi No
20. Pre-Startup Safety Review
20.1. Is the PSSR program considered closure of the MOC program? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
20.2. Who is responsible for conducting the PSSR? (Check only one)
pi Operations
pi MOC coordinator
pi Other_______________
20.3. Is startup safety review following turnaround handled separately than PSSR? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
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Table 3-2. (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
21. Metrics
21.1. Have you developed a program to measure MOC effectiveness? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
21.2. Did you develop your own metrics or adapted it from other sources? (Check only one)
pi Developed own metrics
pi Adapted metrics from other sources
22. Does your MOC program include management of organizational changes? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
22.1. If answer to question (22) is yes, what is the highest level in your organization that requires a
management of organizational change?
____________________________________________________________________
23. Would you be willing to submit a redacted version (deleting all specific references to your
organization) of your MOC policy and procedures manual to the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety
Center for sharing with other companies? (Check only one)
pi Yes
pi No
24. Please describe any general impressions of the MOC program at your plant, such as plans to extend
the MOC program to other areas, portions of the MOC program that are causing difficulty, suggestion
to improve the efficiency of MOC program, etc.
1
Please provide an estimate for 2000 if complete records are available. If complete records for 2000 are
not available, please provide an annual average for the most recent year for which complete records are
available
The distribution of facilities based on type of industry is presented in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2. Distribution of facilities based on type of plant
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Scope
A majority of the respondents reported that management of change programs had
been implemented “plant -wide”. Only 11% of the respondents reported narrow
implementation based on determination of regulatory coverage. However, almost all of
the respondents reported that the MOC program was covering atmospheric tank farms
and other utilities. Respondents were asked about MOC exceptions based on the
following two groups:
Group A Group B
Utilities area Central office building
Portable water station Q.A laboratories
Nitrogen station Railcar wash station
Air plant Environmental areas
Cooling water facilities
Facilities that responded that MOC was implemented plant-wide included Group
A in the MOC implementation. Group B areas were almost always excluded from MOC
implementation. An interesting point made by one of the respondents is that while all
areas are subject to MOC procedures, the level of execution and effort varies from area
to area.
Policy Development
MOC procedures are almost always developed by local plant staff without
external PSM consultant assistance, and without assistance from corporate staff.
However, significant efforts are made to maintain consistent MOC procedures with other
plants within the corporation. Other ways of developing and implementing MOC
procedures that had been reported are:
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• Corporate staff provides guidelines and the plant develops plant-specific MOC
procedures.
• The use of standard plant-wide implementation procedures with varying
degrees of compliance.
• The use of MOC procedures from other plant’s as guidelines to develop a
plant-specific procedure.
Size of MOC Programs
A significant fact revealed by the study was that 25% of the participants could
not obtain the number of Maintenance Work Orders (MWO) initiated annually. In
addition, another 11% could not estimate the number of MOC orders initiated annually.
Several thousand MWOs are initiated annually in the majority of the plants, but 17,000
and 20,000 MWOs were also reported, though, not by the biggest facilities. On the
average, each facility initiated several hundred MOCs annually. The number of annual
MOCs was normalized in order to obtain typical values independent of facility size. The
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Figure 3-3. Total number of annual MOCs per 10 employees per year
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results are plotted in Figure 3-3 (three of the respondents did not share this information).
The average number of MOCs per 10 employees for all the respondents is nine annually.
Most of the values vary in the range 5 to 20 MOCs per 10 employees per year. A
relatively high value of 37 MOCs per 10 employees was obtained from a small (about
150 employees) facility. An examination of the facility records reveals that it also
reports the highest value of annual MWOs per 10 employees. The ratio between the
number of annual MWOs initiated and the annual MOCs initiated varies in the range of
10 to 40, with two exception values of 58 and 170 which probably indicates poor MOC
implementation. More than half of the respondents indicated that they do not keep
records of unapproved MOCs.
Emergency and Temporary Changes
Emergency MOC procedures should be developed for emergency process
changes that cannot be postponed. The procedure needs to address the effects caused by
the changes assuming that they will be taken in consideration, and confirm that all
documentation will be completed.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
0-20 21-50 51-100 101-500
Figure 3-4. Distribution of annual number of emergency and temporary MOCs
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35% of the respondent could not recall any emergency MOCs. One of the respondents
remarked that there is no need for emergency changes in their facility. In most cases, a
few hours were needed to approve emergency MOCs. Figure 3-4 shows the distribution
of emergency and temporary MOCs.  75% of the respondents reported 20 or fewer
emergency MOCs annually and 35% of the respondents reported 20 as fewer temporary
MOCs. As indicated by the data in Figure 3-4, one or two facilities reported large
number of emergency as well as temporary MOCs. The individuals responsible for
authorizing emergency MOCs varied from plant to plant. The responses revealed that
emergency MOCs were authorized by shift superintendent, operations manager, plant
manager, and others. In most cases there were multiple authorization requirements. It
should be noted that the data revealed a few cases in which a clear division was made
between day and off-shift authorization personnel. From the responses, we deduce that
there is a high consistency of auditing the emergency changes as soon as practicable.
We also deduce that there is high consistency of auditing of temporary changes, so as to
restore them to their previous condition. Further analysis of the data provides additional
insights. For example, that there was no consistency as to who was responsible for
restoration of temporary changes to previous conditions. The MOC coordinator, the
MOC initiator, area leaders, as well as engineering and safety personnel carried out this
task.
MOC Record Management
Figure 3-5 shows the distribution of media used for MOC records management.
The responses indicate the preference for storing MOC documentation does not lie
within the plant’s central area. Further analysis shows that approximately only 40%
keep both hard copies and electronic copies of their MOC records, and only about half
use electronic files. The most common group responsible for records maintenance is the
PSM group, engineering, or operation.
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Electronic
Paper copy
Both
Didn’t answer
Audit
More than 40% of the respondents apply the minimum standard required by the
PSM regulations for audits (i.e., 3-year PSM audit) for auditing MOC programs. About
60% of the participants reported that the audits were conducted by corporate staff and
50% involved external consultants as well. The results from the audits revealed that
there was only a small number of miss-classified MWOs that should not have been
classified as MOCs. About 74% of the respondents also indicated that their audits
identified the need for MOC program upgrades. This finding emphasizes the need for
frequent auditing of MOC programs, principally for new PSM management systems. A
screening of audit recommendations identified some common “weak links”:
• Lack of training
• Demand to apply MOC to organizational changes
• In some cases, revising of the MOC program
• Ambiguity regarding temporary changes
Lack of training was noted quite often and this may point to the need for
developing guidelines for MOC training programs or at a minimum, developing
requirements for auditing the training programs separately from the PSM training
programs.
Figure 3-5. Distribution of media used for MOC record management
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MOC Software
MOC software products are not commonly used. Two-thirds of the participants
do not use software for implementation of Management of Change programs. Of the
remaining 33%, only two facilities use commercial software products, while the others
use “in -house”software.
MOC Program Awareness Training
56% of the respondents indicated that formal training classes for MOC program
awareness are provided for new employees. Some of the same 56% respondents stated
that additional MOC program awareness training was provided at other occasions, such
as informal safety meetings. Other facilities reported that they offered on-the-job
training and/or informal training only. A few facilities reported no training at all, and
one facility reported computer-based training only. Formal training classes, wherever
provided, were scheduled on a “need -only”basis, while a few respondents reported
regular annual training. In general, half of the respondents stated that they provide MOC
program awareness training apart from other PSM awareness training. There is no
consistency regarding the entity that is responsible for conducting the training - it is
uniformly distributed between MOC coordinators, operations, and others.
Impact on Risk Management Plan
The EPA Risk Management Program regulation requires re-submittal of the risk
management plan (RMP) within six months of certain changes (e.g., changes which
cause the worst-case scenario to increase or decrease by a factor of two). Almost half of
the respondents stated that the safety department was responsible for checking whether a
change will result in revising the RMP. Only two facilities indicated process changes
that resulted in update and re-submittal of the RMP. One of these was as a result of
introduction of a chemical in the process. The other one reported changes in their Off-
site Consequence Analysis (OCA). The same facility reported another significant
71
change that resulted in a review of its OCA, but it was decided later that the change did
not required the re-submittal of the RMP within six months.
PHA Revalidation
The questionnaire asked for the criteria used by the respondents for making
decisions regarding the need for a PHA associated with MOCs. The common criteria for
determination of the need for performing PHA are:
• All check points of Change Hazard Review are not satisfied
• Complexity
• New materials
• Changes in the process chemistry
• Changes with a major safety impact
56% of the respondents stated that the level of detail of PHA’s varied according to the
complexity of the change. Most of the respondents indicated that they used What-If for
simple cases and HAZOP for more complex cases.
Risk Screening or MOC Ranking
The MOC questionnaire contained a series of questions that are based upon the
concept that proposed MOCs should be screened to provide the appropriate resources in
order to evaluate the impact on safety from the proposed change. About 44% of the
respondents stated that they were using risk screening of MOCs. Local in-house staff
developed most of the screening procedures with some input from corporate PSM
groups. There was no consistency regarding who would conduct the risk screening
procedure. There were responses that indicated both the MOC initiator and the MOC
coordinator as individuals responsible for MOC screening.
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Risk screening procedure should determine categories of risk in order to classify the
screening results. The number of categories varied between 3 to 7, however, in one case
20 categories was also reported.
Five (19%) facilities reported that potential consequences and potential events
were evaluated separately in the determination of risk categories. Checklists were noted
to be the preferred evaluation methods over experienced staff evaluation.
Safety Review of MOC
Both OSHA and EPA regulations mandate safety review of MOCs. The optimal
stage to initiate a safety review is when preliminary engineering of the change has been
completed. Thus, the safety review should take place before the detailed design stage.
The survey revealed that most of the facilities that used risk screening of MOCs, used
different safety review techniques for different categories of risk. A checklist is most
commonly used for low risk MOCs. None of the facilities submit their safety reviews to
corporate safety staff for evaluation.
Authorization
As indicated in Figure 3-6, the number of authorizations for MOC approval
varied widely with 76% of the respondents requiring four or fewer authorizations.
However, some respondents indicated higher number of authorizations with one
indicating a maximum of 10 authorizations. A few of the respondents indicated that
those are the maximum but the actual number of authorizations is determined on a case-
by-case basis according to the risk level. Most of the facilities use the same number of
authorizations for levels of risk screening as well as for all MOC risk categories.
As revealed from the survey, at most facilities Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)
is identified as the closure of MOC procedure. PSSR is conducted by both operations
and MOC coordinators; but mainly by operations. Some 63% of the participants
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reported that PSSR following the turnarounds were handled separately from other
PSSR’s.
Applying MOC to Organizational Changes
Only 44% of the respondents reported applying MOC programs to organizational
changes. Some of the respondents indicated that some of the audits recommended the
inclusion of organizational changes in the MOC programs.
 Summary and Conclusions
In general, MOC programs are implemented plant-wide. Only half of the
respondents in this survey apply MOC procedures to organizational changes. MOC
policies and procedures are developed almost entirely by the local plant personnel
without external assistance except in a few cases. There is a high degree of consistency
with regard to restoring changes related to temporary MOCs to their previous conditions,
although audit results pointed to some level of ambiguity regarding temporary MOC
issues. Majority of the respondents reported difficulties in recalling elementary
emergency MOC data. Lack of training was most noted in audit recommendations and
Figure 3-6. Distribution of number of authorizations required for MOC approval
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may raise the question of the need to develop guidelines for training for MOC programs.
Half of the respondents indicated that they do not use risk-screening procedures.
The well-known phrase “You can’t manage what you don’t measure” illustrates
the need to measure the effectiveness of Management of Change programs.
Unfortunately, only about a third of the participants measure MOC effectiveness. An
interesting piece of information was the opinion of the respondents regarding the level of
implementation of the MOC program at their sites. Of the 50% that responded to this
question, 38% indicated that the program needed improvement while the remaining 12%
were satisfied with their program.
Benchmarking of Emergency Preparedness and Response Practices in the Process
Industry
Background
Process safety of a chemical plant encompasses several layers of protection.
Control measures, shutdown systems, release absorption, accumulation of releases by
dikes, and protection by barriers, are layers of protection that are intended to prevent the
development of an event because of deviations from normal operation conditions.
Emergency Response is the next layer of protection that is intended to control an event if
possible, or to reduce consequences in cases of loss of control. However, a reliable
response to an emergency event requires planning. This section presents results of a
benchmarking study of practices of emergency preparedness and response of 15 facilities
in the process industry.
Unanticipated circumstances may yield emergency events. Emergency Planning
adds additional layer of protection to circumstances where all of the other layers of
protection failed to prevent the incident. Figure 3-7 demonstrates the three major
components of emergency planning:
Ten chemical plants, three petrochemical facilities, a single gas plant, and a
single pharmaceutical facility, participated in the survey study (the Plants). The number
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of processes in the Plants varies from a single process gas plant to a 160 processes site.
The range of number of employees varies between 27 to 25,000 employees.
OSHA PSM and EPA RMP requirements with regard to emergency planning are briefly
summarized by Dennison [39].
Emergency preparedness requires a multi-domain deployment. Preparedness
process begins with identification of credible scenarios based on which consequence
analyses are conducted, and appropriate response strategies are developed. The analysis
of resources and capabilities that are required for response to the emergency scenarios is
part of the Preparedness stage. This analysis examines the resources and the capabilities
at the facilities, at neighboring sites, and the resources that are available at the local
community. The development of resources is conducted according to the resource
assessment and the level of corporation amongst these parties and other emergency
support organizations. Figure 3-8 presents a flow chart of the emergency preparedness
stage.
Since at least two parties are involved in emergency situations, in addition to the
network within the facility, communication system becomes crucial element to a
successful execution of emergency plans in real time situations as well as in drills.
Emergency Planning
Preparedness
Response
Recovery
Figure 3-7. Components of emergency planning
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The complex nature of emergency events requires a very clear hierarchy of
command, and a procedure that should be clear of ambiguities. Training and assessments
of the potential collaboration among the parties that are involved in the response to
emergency events are extremely important. Quite often, preparedness programs are
reestablished due to assessments of drills.
The development of physical infrastructure for emergency events consists of the
following:
• Development of shelters and safe heavens
• Establishment of Emergency Operation Center (EOC)
• Development of emergency communication capabilities, and
• Development of appropriate medical support infrastructure
Emergency systems are developed parallel to the development of physical
facilities. Following is a typical list of emergency systems:
• Emrgency power supply
• Emergency water supply
• Communication systems
• Emergency management support computer system
• Site and community allert systems
• Adequate incident command transportaion
• Appropriate control room protection measures
The objective of this is the benchmarking of Emergency Planning practices
among the facilities in the process industries. The “Guidelines for Technical Planning for
On-Site Emergencies”[40] was one of the references consulted in the development of a
questionnaire for this study. The questionnaire was distributed to more than 50 plants,
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out of which 15 facilities responded. The questionnaire is reproduced in its entirety in
Table 3-3.
The effects of September 11
th
, 2001 events on the security of facilities in the
process industries are still not completely understood, and there is no consensus
agreeament with regard to the way that emergency planning should address similar
events. Thus, this work did not incorporate elements such as vulnerability assessments.
Assessment and
Development of
Capabilities
Development of
Response Strategy
Establishment of
Emergency
Support
Systems
Development of
Physical Facilities
Identification
of Credible
Scenarios
Preparedness
Figure 3-8. Block diagram of the emergency preparedness stage
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Table 3-3. Benchmarking emergency preparedness programs questionnaire
________________________________________________________________________________________________
1. Facility Size and Type
1.1 How many employees (including contractors) work at this site? For uniformity, include
everyone on the payroll, including the administrative and contract personnel.
______________________________________________________
1.2 How many separate process areas are inside the plant complex?
_____________________________________________________
1.3 Which of the following best characterizes the process operations at this site? (Check only one)
 Chemical
 Refining
 Petrochemical
 Pharmaceutical
 Food
 Gas Plan
 Other (please specify______________________________)
2. Identifying credible incidents
2.1 A lot of efforts are invested in order to define ‘worst credible incidents’in order to plan an
emergency program. In some cases, worst possible incidents (incidents with sever consequences,
but with very poor likelihood) are taken into consideration during emergency planning. Were
worst possible incidents taken into consideration in your facility’s emergency planning?
 Yes
 No
2.2 Our emergency program covers incidents with the following magnitude:
(Check all that are applicable.)
 Local incidents
 Moderate incidents
 Catastrophic incidents
2.3 Which of the following best describes the process of identifying credible incidents in your
facility’s emergency planning:
 Using intuition and rules of thumb
 Unstructured expert brainstorming
 Applying quantitative risk analysis methods
 Investigation of the Process Hazard Analysis to identify
credible incidents
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Table 3-3. (Continued)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
2.4 Incident prioritizing is also necessary for emergency planning. The likelihood of initiation of
incident is fundamental to the prioritizing process. However, estimation of the likelihood of failure
of the protecting system can contribute to this process and change priorities. Does your emergency
planning consider protecting systems failures in the prioritizing process?
 Yes, consider incident events and protection systems failure for prioritization
 No, consider only incident events for prioritization
 Don’t know
2.5 Commercial incident modeling software is available to evaluate incidents consequences. How did
your emergency planner evaluates these consequences?
 Simple calculations.
 Homemade software.
 Commercial software (specify___________________________).
2.6 Incidents can have long-term effects on the environment. These effects are not simple to
estimate. Has your emergency program considered long-term environmental effects?
 Yes
 No
2.7 Has a catastrophic scenario due to terrorist attack been considered in your emergency planning?
 Yes
 No
3. Capabilities and resources assessments
3.1 A variety of facilities may be used to support emergency operations. Below is a representational
list of facilities [40]). Check all that is available in your plant:
 Short-term shelters
 Save havens (Shelter with alternative air breathing source)
 Incident command post
 Emergency Operation Center (EOC)
 Media information Center (MIC)
 Medical support facility (other the first aid room)
 Alternate water supply
 Community and facility alerting systems
 Real-time modeling system
 Emergency management computing system
 Emergency power system
 Meteorological instruments
3.2 If a medical facility other then first aid room is available, briefly describe its capabilities and
limitations:
_____________________________________________________________________________
3.3 Preparedness of the nearest hospital may be crucial to the consequences of incidents. Is the
nearest hospital capable of handling massive casualties?
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Table 3-3. (Continued)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Yes
 No
 The hospital is not involved in our emergency program
3.4 if yes, is it aware regarding the chemicals used in your facility?
 Yes
 They have general idea
 No
3.5 Is other medical center(s) part from your facility’s emergency net?
 Yes
 No
3.6 Are medical airlift resources available and prepared?
 Yes
 No
3.7 Are local emergency agencies familiar with the plant layout and hazards?
 Yes
 No
3.8 Are neighboring sites aware of and prepared for your facility emergencies (and Vice Versa)?
 No
 They have a general idea
 EH&S officers coordinate the mutual emergency preparedness and
responses
 Corporate committee established and mutual periodical drills are
operated
3.9 Are contractors a part of the plant emergency response program?
 Yes
 No
If yes, are they trained to their jobs?
 Yes
 No
3.10 Do personnel structure changes cause emergency program re-evaluation?
 Yes
 No
3.11 Does Management of Change procedure address changes to your emergency program?
 Yes
 No
3.12 Check the box that applies in your site:
 The site consists of a fire brigade
 The site depends on local fire department
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Table 3-3. (Continued)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
3.12 Are fire brigade personnel available outside of daytime shift?
 Yes.
 No.
3.14 Does the local community fire brigades participating in the site drills?
 Yes
 No
3.15 Using neighboring sites’emergen cy equipment is efficient in terms of cost-benefit, and can be
justified for certain types of equipment. If this case applies to your plant, list the shared type of
equipment: _____________________________________________
4. Physical facilities and systems
4.1. From reference [40]:
“Shelters - provide passive protection for inhabitants when ventilation is off and
all windows and other openings are closed.
Safe havens – Provide protection by providing alternative source of breathing air supply.”
Mostly, control rooms are used as shelters or safe havens.
Control rooms in your facility are designed as:
 Shelters
 Shelters, but other buildings are serving as safe havens
 Safe havens
4.2. Which of the following has been assigned to be used as Emergency Operation Center (EOC)?
 No EOC in the plant
 Control Room
 Selecting arbitrary office/room.
 Conference room
 Specially designed building (or part of a building)
 Other (specify_______________________________________)
4.3. How many employees are required to be in the EOC in emergency?
 1-10
 10-20
 20-50
 Higher
4.4. What is the distance between the EOC and the nearest process?
 Less than 50 yards
 50 –100 yards
 100 – 300 yards
 300 – 1000 yards
 More then a mile
4.5. Is an alternative EOC available?
 Yes
 No
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Table 3-3. (Continued)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
4.6. The EOC is designed as a (see 4.1 for explanation of terms):
 Shelter
 Safe haven
4.7. Is an emergency power supply available to the EOC?
 Yes
 No
4.8. Which of the following best describes your medical support facility (MSF)?
 First aid room
 Day to day emergency clinic
 A large room equipped to become MSF
 Designated building (or part of building) to serve as MSF
4.9. An industrial fire truck is a powerful piece of equipment in certain scenarios. Does your plant
employ one?
 Yes
 No
5. Communication
5.1. Do local, off-site agencies hold open emergency open channel(s) to the plant?
 Yes
 No
5.2 who are the local community representatives that your plant is coordinating and communicating
with?
 Emergency Management agency
 Fire department officers
 County emergency service director
 City manager officers
 Mayor
 Other (specify________________________________________)
5.3 Is a tone alert system installed in your plant?
 Yes
 No (if other systems then tone alert, specify)
5.4 List the tone alert system codes and their meanings:
5.5 What type of alert system(s) is being used to inform the local community regarding
emergencies?
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Table 3-3. (Continued)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Tone alert system
 Cable television override system
 Computer telephone dialing system
 Other:
5.6 How often are on-site and off-site alarm systems tested?
On-site Off-site
 Not tested at all  not tested at all
 Weekly  Weekly
 Monthly  Monthly
 Quarterly  Quarterly
 Every six months  every six months
 Annually  Annually
 Not applicable  Not applicable
5.7 An emergency program may be supported by variety of agencies and organizations. Check those
that are applicable in your plant ‘s emergency program:
 Fire department
 Police department
 Emergency medical center
 Office of emergency service
 Emergency preparedness organization
 Civil defense agency
 Local emergency planning committee
 Department of health
 Highway department
 Public and private hospitals
 Red Cross
 Salvation Army
6. Metrics
6.1 Have you developed procedures to measure your emergency program effectiveness?
 Yes
 No
6.2 Did you develop your own metrics or adapted from other sources?
 Developed own metrics
 Adapted from other sources
 Not applicable
6.3 Is your metric procedure designed to measure the adequacy of existing
emergency facilities, supplies, and equipment?
 Yes
 No
 Not applicable
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Table 3-3. (Continued)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
6.4 Is your metric procedure designed to measure your level of coordination with
off-site emergency response agencies?
 Yes
 No
 Not applicable
6.5 How frequently is your emergency program reviewed:
 Annually
 Minimally, as required by OSHA PSM regulation
 Minimally, plus after major changes applied
 Other:
7 Positions
7.1 Who is designated to serve as Incident Commander (IC)?
 Relevant production manager
 Relevant plant manager
 EH&S officer
 Vice president
 CEO
 Other: _______________________________________________________________
7.2 Who is responsible for determining the severity of an incident (Local, moderate, catastrophic)?
 Production manager
 Plant manager
 EH&S officer
 IC
7.3 Who is responsible for updating the equipment and supply inventory lists?
 Operation personnel
 EH&S personnel
 Contractor
 Other: _____________________________________________________________
7.4 Who makes the evacuation decision?
 Production manager
 Plant manager
 EH&S officer
 IC
 Other: __________________________________________________________
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Table 3-3. (Continued)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
8. Training
8.1 Employees, regardless of their responsibilities during emergencies, are required to be trained
for emergency awareness and response. Below is a list of subjects that can be covered by non-
emergency team employee training. Check all the subjects that are applicable in your facility:
 Identification of hazardous situations
 Identification of physical warning signs (smoke, smell,..)
 Evacuation routes and shelter locations
 Emergency reporting procedures
 Usage of PPE
 Identification of types of fire
 Usage of proper fire extinguishing equipment
 Drills on usage of PPE and fire extinguishing
8.2 Are contractor employees trained like other employees?
 Yes
 No
8.3 Who is responsible for coordinating the emergency training program?
 Plant manager
 EH&S officer
 PSM team
 Human resources
 Other: ________________________________________
8.4 Is simulated crisis communication drilled?
 Yes
 No
8.5 Are training records kept in your plant?
 Yes
 No
____________________________________________________________________________________
The Process of Identification of Credible Scenarios
The process of identifying credible scenarios reveals events that emergency
planning should address. A process hazard evaluation will lead to a large list of potential
incidents. This list should be assessed to determine likelihood and consequences of each
of the incidents and then prioritized according to the risk associated with them.
For each incident it is possible to determine the worst-case scenario. Loss of
containment, where all the material is being released instantaneously is a worst-case
scenario. However, the likelihood of development of such a scenario is extremely low.
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Preparedness for emergencies that consist of worst-case scenarios requires enormous
resources and may overwhelm the business operability of the facility. For each scenario,
the outcomes should be listed, and the consequences and probabilities should be
evaluated, while considering the facility’s management control. Events such as
instantaneous loss of containment are of major concern in the process industries,
however, measures, such as control systems, overpressure relief, alarms, mechanical as
well as non-destructive tests reduce the likelihood of development of such as scenario.
93% of the plants considered worst-case scenarios in the development of their
emergency plans. These plans cover all three levels of magnitudes of events: local,
moderate, and catastrophic.
Identification of Process Areas with High Hazards
The majority of the facilities in the process industries have a large inventory of
hazardous chemical in many areas in the facility. The large number of chemicals along
with the large number of equipment and the variety of potential incidents that can occur
from the combinations of chemicals-equipment lead to an enormous number of possible
scenarios. As noted earlier, it is impractical to plan for all emergencies. Therefore, it is
neccesary to analyze and prioritize the scenarios. This process is presented in Figure 3-9.
Large number of techniques and available for the identification of areas of major
hazards. The results of examination of the plant with these techniques leads to a list of
ranked areas that are analyzed to identify credible scenarios. However, the results of the
analysis may vary if the analysis does not consider protection system failure. Only three
of the plants took into consideration failure of protection systems in the process of
ranking scenarios for emergency planning.
Techniques for Identification of Credible Scenarios
As with identification of areas with major hazards, variety of techniques are
available to identify Credible Scenarios. The depth of analysis can vary from an informal
review that involves intuition to a full Process Hazard Analysis session. Results from a
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Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) can be extremely helpful if the analysis is done
thoroughly, since identification of credible scenarios is one of the purposes of
conducting PHAs.
The participants in the survey were asked to check which of the following four
best describes the process of identifying credible scenarios in their plants:
• Using intuition and rules of thumbs
• Unstructured expert brainstorming
• Application of Quantitative Risk Analysis methods
• Use of the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) to identify credible scenarios
As Figure 3-10 reveals, the majority of the facilities used PHA results for the
process of identifying credible scenarios. 20% of the plants conducted quantitative risk
analysis, and only one of these 20% used quantitative risk analysis as the only tool for
Identification of Process Areas with High-
level Hazards
Identification of Credible Scenarios
Scenario Prioritization for
Consequence Analysis Selection
Scenario Selection for
Emergency Planning
Figure 3-9. Process of scenario selection for emergency planning
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credible incident identification. The only plant that used intuition and rules of thumbs
used quantitative risk analysis and PHA results as well.
Consequence analysis is a thorough procedure that requires major efforts.
Therefore, several commercial software were developed in the early to mid 90’s to
support this procedure. EPA, as an example, offers free downloadable software on its
website, that can be useful in consequence analysis. However, other organizations have
used commercial software as well as tailored software in order to be able to respond to
EPA RMP, and OSHA PSM requirements. The survey reveals that currently none of the
plants are using tailored software for consequence analysis. However, 27% are using
simple calculations to assess the consequences of the various scenarios. Only 20% of the
plants use programs that are available (free) on the website of the Environmental
Protection Agency. Long-term as well as short-term effects on the environment are being
considered in the plans of 60% of the plants.
As noted earlier, the effects of 9/11/2001 events are not addressed in this study.
However, the plants were asked whether their emergency program considered
catastrophic scenario due to terrorist attack. 73% responded positively.
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Figure 3-10. Methods to identify credible scenarios
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Assessment of Capabilities and Resources
The magnitude of incident that the credible scenarios will cause is the input to
the process of assessment of resources and capabilities.
As Figure 3-11reveals, the resources that are required to deal with emergencies
are based on assessments in three domains:
• On-site
• Neighboring facilities
• Local community
Emergency Support Facilities
Following is a list of emergency support facilities that are useful in emergency
scenarios:
Fires and Explosions
Assessment of On-site
Capabilities
Assessment of Capabilities
of Neighboring Facilities
Assessment of Capabilities
of
Local Community
Releases of Hazardous Material
On-site Capabilities
Assessment
Assessment of
capabilities of local
Community EMS
Assessment
of Local Hospital
Preparedness
Assessment of Capabilities and Resources
Figure 3-11. Assessment of resources and capabilities
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• Short-term shelters [StS]
• Safe havens (Shelter with alternative air breathing source) [SH]
• Incident command post [ICP]
• Emergency Operation Center [EOC]
• Media information Center [MIC]
• Medical support facility (other than first aid room) [MSF]
• Alternate water supply [AWS]
• Community and facility alert systems [ALERT]
• Real-time modeling system [RtMS]
• Emergency management computing system [EMCS]
• Emergency power system [EPS]
• Meteorological instruments [MI]
Figure 3-12 demonstrates the level of availability of these facilities among the
plants. Safe Havens are available at 40% of the plants, alternate water supply is available
at 33% of the plants only, and emergency management computing system is part of the
emergency support systems at 20% only. Other supporting facilities are quite common
among the plants in the survey.
Medical Facilities
As for medical facility other than first aid room, three of the plants have
capabilities of a medical department. These facilities consist of medical doctors, nurses,
and variety of equipment to support emergency situations as well as day-to-day needs.
Common to these plants is that they consist of more than 5,000 employees. Third of the
participants do not employ medical support facility that is more than a first aid room.
The medical capability of the other 7 plants are better than that of a first-aid room and
can be used for stabilization of the patients until they are evacuated to the nearest local
community medical facility.
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The capability of the nearest hospital to handle massive casualties is an important
parameter in emergency planning. Furthermore, awareness of the hospital with regard to
the chemicals that are being used in the plant could be crucial to the ability to handle
casualties in incidents that involves release of hazardous materials. 93% of the plants
indicated that hospitals in their area can handle massive casualties. Hospitals near 80%
of the plants are aware about chemicals in the facilities, and hospitals near the other 20%
have a general idea only.
However, 87% of the plants increased their emergency net to medical facilities
other than the nearest one, and have a medical airlift available and ready at all time.
Fire Fighting
On-site fire brigade are available at 93% of the plants, and their fire fighters are
available outside of daytime shift. Local community fire brigades participate in site drills
of all the plants. Only 40% of the plants have some form of mutual assistance and
equipment sharing. However, 80% of the plants have equipment with at least a single
fire truck. One of the plants noted that all their equipment is listed on a master database
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
S
tS
IC
P
E
O
C
A
L
E
R
T
E
P
S
M
IC
M
IC
M
S
F
R
tM
S
S
H
A
W
S
E
M
C
S
A
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
 a
m
o
n
g
 t
h
e 
p
la
n
ts
 [
%
]
Figure 3-12. Availability of emergency support facilities
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and is available from/to 17 industries, 25 fire departments, 11 law enforcement agencies,
and 22 public safety agencies under a master mutual aid agreement.
Physical Facilities and Systems
Shelters: -CCPS [41] defines the following:
• “Shelters - provide passive protection for inhabitants when ventilation is off and
all windows and other openings are closed”.
• “Safe havens – Provide protection by providing alternative source of breathing
air supply”.
Control rooms are used as shelters or safe havens. Control rooms are used as
shelters at 53% of the plants, and safe havens are not available. At 27% of the plants
control rooms are used as safe havens in emergencies, and in the remaining 20%, control
rooms are shelters, however, other facility is used as safe haven.
Emergency Operation Center (EOC): - Assessments, development of response
strategy, communication and control of activities in emergency event are conducted
from the EOC. The EOC allows the emergency management and staff to effectively
supervise the activities and to make decisions with regard to development of events in
the area. Factors such as the facility that is being used as EOC, distance of the EOC from
processes, and the design of EOC have an enormous effect on the effectiveness of
emergency operation and management.
Following is a list of facilities that can be used as EOC:
• Control Room
• Arbitrary office/room
• Conference room
• Specially designed building
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Specially designed buildings are being used by 80% of the plants as EOC. 13%
are using conference room, and one of the plants uses facility other than these in the list.
Eighty percents of the plants reported having an alternative EOC. Two of the
plants indicated that the alternative EOC is located off-site. The EOCs are designed as
shelters at 80% of the plants and as safe havens in the others.
The distance between the EOC and the processes is one of the factors that
determines the EOC sensitivity to the intensity of the events. Figure 3-13 shows the
range of distances of EOCs from the nearest process in the plant.
Alternative power supply is crucial in emergencies. Only one of the plants reported a
lack of alternative power supply for their EOC.
Communication
Several elements in emergency planning are extremely crucial to appropriate
execution of emergency response. An effective communication net is one of these
elements. The net is required to allow communication between the following: EOC and
on-site responders, EOC and off-site responders, EOC and local agencies, EOC and
corporate management, EOC and local medical facilities, EOC and employees, Incident
Commander and responders, EOC and employees’ families, and EOC and media. A
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Figure 3-13. Distribution of distances of EOC from process areas
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convenient way to maintain communication is by maintaining an open channel between
the local off-site agencies and the plant, as indicated by 93% of the respondents. The
majority of the plants coordinate and communicate their emergency planning with the
Emergency Management Agency, and with the fire departments. Half of the plants
involved the County Emergency Service Directors in their plans, and 20% involve the
City Management Officials and the mayor as well.
As for alert systems, tone alert system is available at all the Plants. Although tone
alert system codes vary, the majority consists of at least three codes: weather-related,
major emergency, and evacuation.
Local communities can be informed about emergency situations in several ways.
Tone alert systems and computerized telephone dialing systems are commonly used by
half of the plants. Cable TV override system is an alert measure too, however, it is being
used by only 27% of the plants. The local authority is identified as another way to
communicate the emergency to the local community by 27% of the plants. Common to
these plants is that this type of alerting system is the only measure to warn the
community a developing emergency event.
On-site alarm system is tested weekly by all of the plants. Off-site alarm systems
are tested weekly or monthly by 60%, and annually by one of the plants. The other 33%
do not test the alert system or an off-site alert system is not part of their emergency
system.
An emergency program may be supported by variety of organizations. Figure 3-
14 emphasizes the level of involvement of these organizations in emergency planning
among the plants.
As can be expected, fire and police departments support most of the programs.
75% of the plants involve the Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) in their
plans.
Metrics
Only 60% of the plants have procedures in place to measure the effectiveness of
their emergency program. The procedure is being used to measure the adequacy of
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existing emergency facilities, supplies, and equipment in all 60% of these plants.
Moreover, at all of these plants, but one, the procedure examines the effectiveness of
coordination with off-site emergency response agencies.
Ninety percents of the plants review their program annually. One of these plants
reported a semi-annual management review as well, and that any incident and potential
incident generates a discussion of response planning and contingencies in investigation
and safety meeting.
Positions
Table 3-4 presents the distribution of the variety of positions in the plants who
assume the role of an Incident Commander (IC) during an emergency. Determination of
the severity of an event, decision with regard to the level of escalation, and timing of this
decision has tremendous effect on the consequences. Misinterpretation of magnitude as
local instead of moderate, or as moderate instead of catastrophic can cause significant
loss and many casualties. Therefore, the personnel that are assigned to make this
decision carry a heavy burden. At 87% of the plants IC is responsible for this decision.
EH&S officers are responsible for this decision at the other 13%. At 93% of the plants
the decision on evacuation is in the hands of the Incident Commander. Only one of the
plants nominates EH&S officers to make this decision. In two of the plants the decision
is in the hands of two positions: (1) plant manager as well as Incident Commander; (2)
Incident Commander as well as lead operator.
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The responsibility of equipment updating and supply inventory is distributed as
follows:
• EH&S officers at 67% of the plants
• Emergency Response Personnel at 33% of the plants, and
• Production Manager at 7% of the plants
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Figure 3-14. Level of involvement of organizations in emergency planning
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Training
Employees are required to be trained for emergency awareness and response,
regardless of their responsibilities during emergencies. The “Guidelines for Process
Safety Fundamentals in General Plant Operations” [41] provides descriptions of these
types of training. Table 3-5 consists of a summary list of training subjects and
distribution of its implementation in the plants.
Table 3-4. Distribution of variety of positions in the plant as IC
Position Distribution [%]
Emergency Response Officer 40
Production Managers 27
Plant Superintendent 13
EH&S Officer 13
Plant Manager 7
Executives 0
Table3-5. Distribution of implementation of training subjects
Training Subject Distribution of Implementation
[%]
Identification of hazardous situations 100
Identification of physical warning signs
(smoke; smell;..)
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Evacuation routes and shelter locations 100
Emergency reporting procedures 100
Usage of PPE 100
Identification of types of fire 93
Usage of proper fire extinguishing equipment 100
Drills on usage of PPE and fire extinguishing 80
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The survey reveals that contract employees are provided the same training as
other employees at 60% of the plants only. The responsibility to coordinate training for
emergency preparedness is mainly in the hands of EH&S officers and personnel in
similar positions. As for training records, only one of the plants reported that these
records are not kept. 80% of the plants simulate crisis communication in their drills.
Summary and Conclusions
The study reveals several interesting findings. Only 20% of the plants consider
protection systems failure in the process of ranking scenarios for emergency planning.
This process is sensitive to the presence of these systems. The results of PHA session are
used as an input for the process of identification of credible scenarios widely. Although
EPA’s website offers free softwa re to support consequence analysis, only 20% of the
plants take advantage of the free software.
The analysis of resources and capabilities revealed that safe havens are available
at 40% of the plants, and that alternative water supply is available at 33% only. Plants
that consist of more than 5,000 employees employ medical facility with the capabilities
of a medical department. 80% of the plants are equipped with at least one fire truck.
Although alert systems that directly warn the public with regard to emergencies is a
convenient measure in terms of early notification, 27% of the plants in the survey
depend on the local authorities for the notification of the public.
Procedures that evaluate the effectiveness of emergency program have been
developed by 60% of the plants. However, 93% of the plants review their program
annually.
The survey revealed that contract employees are provided the same training as
other employees by 60% of the plants.
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Benchmarking of Incident Investigation Practices Questionnaire
General
Facilitating a well-developed Incident Investigation procedure is a crucial
component in Process Safety Programs. OSHA requires that regulated facilities develop
a procedure to investigate incidents. The regulations specify a timeframe for the
initiation of an investigation and basic requirements for an investigation team. Incident
Investigation is a through process and is implemented in various ways. Incident
investigations may vary in the major approach to the investigation, the type of
techniques that are used, the way evidence is treated, and other characteristics.
The “Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents” [42] was one of
the references consulted in the development of a questionnaire for benchmarking Process
Safety Incident Investigation (PSII) practices. The development of the following
questionnaire is aimed at identifying the diversity of implementation of these practices in
the industry.
Definitions
The definitions of several of the major parameters in incident investigations may
vary slightly in the literature. The following definitions were used in this document:
• Root Cause: - an underlying prime reason why an incident occurred
• Deductive Approach: - Deductive logic progresses from the general to the
specific. A major event is placed in the top of the problem and the logic
progress backward in time and examines possible scenarios that can
develop a path to the top
• Inductive Approach: - In Inductive Approach, the logic progress from a
selected event or set of facts, and moves forward in time, examining
possible effect, results, and consequences
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• Multiple Root Cause Analysis: - A deductive search for all credible
scenarios in which an event could occur.
The Questionnaire
Table 3-6 consists of the questionnaire for benchmarking PSII.
Table 3-6. Benchmarking process safety incident investigation programs questionnaire
__________________________________________________________________________
1. General Approach
1.1 There are three major approaches to conduct PSII. Check the one that best
describes the approach in your plant:
Informal investigation performed by immediate supervisors
Committee-based investigations using expert judgment to find a
credible solution of cause and remedy
Multiple-cause, systems oriented investigation that focuses on root
cause determination, integrated with an overall process safety
management program
2. PSII Techniques
2.1 Which of the following types of analysis are mainly used for PSII in
your plant?
Deductive
Inductive
2.2 The following list consist of large number of techniques for PSII.
Please check all the techniques that are being used in your plant for
PSII:
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Causal Tree Method (CTM)
Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT)
Multiple-cause, systems-oriented Incident Investigation Technique
(MCSOII)
Accident Anatomy Method (AAM)
Action Error Analysis (AEA)
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Table 3-6. (continued)
__________________________________________________________________________
Cause-Effect Logic Diagram (CELD)
Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
Accident Evolution and Barrier (AEB)
Work Safety Analysis (WSA)
Change Evaluation/Analysis (CEA)
Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES)
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
Multi-linear Event Sequencing (MES)
Sequentially Timed Event Plot (STEP)
Systematic Cause Analysis Techniques (SCAT)
TapRoot
TM
Incident Investigation System
Technique of Operations Review (TOR)
2.3 Several of the techniques listed above were originally developed as
computer-based techniques. Are computer-based PSII techniques
implemented in your plant?
Yes
No
The validity of PSII techniques consists of many parameters. Several of these parameters are listed in the
questions bellow.
2.4 PSII techniques in your plant are effective in supporting the following
(Check all that apply):
Near-misses
Minor Incidents
Major Incidents
2.5 The extent of acknowledging standards and industrial guidelines in the
implementation of PSII techniques in your plant is as follows:
Weak
Moderate
Strong
2.6 PSII is not an exact science. The degree of freedom in judgment during
implementation of PSII techniques may vary widely. Implementation of
PSII techniques in one plant may be very prescriptive and may reduce user
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Table 3-6. (continued)
_________________________________________________________________________
subjectivity to minimum, while implementation of the same technique
in other plant can be strongly dependent on user identity.
Implementation of PSII techniques in your plant is:
Prescriptive, the user is required to maintain a minimal level of judgment
Moderately dependent on the user - certain degree of judgment is
required from the user, however his/her degree of freedom is limited
Strongly user dependent – it is likely that two different users
will arrive at different conclusions
3. Databases
Incident related databases could be helpful in learning from the experience of others, sharing information
with others, and identifying areas of weaknesses, benchmarking performance, and more. The following
questions aim to reveal the level of incorporation of databases in the process of PSII.
3.1 Is equipment reliability performance recorded in your plant?
Yes
No
3.2 Are these records submitted to a database?
Yes
No
If yes, are these records submitted to a central reliability
database (similar to the equipment reliability database that the
Center for Chemical Process Safety maintains)?
Yes (Please specify: _____________________________)
No
3.3 Does the PSII procedure in your plant use historical information from
incident databases such as EPA ARIP (Accident Release Information
program), EPA Risk Management Program (RMP), etc.?
Yes
No
(If yes please specify: __________________________________)
103
Table 3-6. (continued)
4. Management Commitment
4.1 Which of the following best describes the characteristics of
implementation of PSII procedure in your plant?
Focus on finding causes
Focus on assigning blame
4.2 In your opinion, is the resource of PSII sufficient to
sustain the investigation?
Yes
No
4.3 The level of implementation of recommendations from PSII is among the
indicators of the commitment of the management system to process
safety. Which of the following best describes the level of effort invested
in implementation of PSII recommendations?
Low
Moderate
High
4.4 As with level of implementation of recommendations, the level of
communication of “lesson s learned” is among the indicators of
management commitment to process safety. Which of the
following best describes the situation in your plant?
The value of learning lessons from incidents is strongly emphasized
Lessons learned from previous incidents are discussed in formal
occasions such as safety trainings and meetings
Lessons learned are rarely communicated
4.5 The investigation of near-misses may have the same benefits as PSII.
However, these investigations are not as common as PSII. Are near
misses investigated in your plant?
No
Yes
104
Table 3-6. (continued)
_______________________________________________________________________________
If yes, are there any parameters governing the decision to
investigate near-misses?
No. All near-misses are investigated
All near-misses are investigated, however, the extent of the
investigation varies
Yes, the parameters are as follows: ________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
4.6 Does the system in your plant establish a positive and comfortable
environment that encourages reporting incidents and near-misses?
Yes
No
4.7 Briefly describe the way lessons learned are being communicated in
your plant: ____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
4.8 Organizations use periodic publications of incident abstracts to
communicate lessons learned. Does your organization use periodic
publications for that purpose?
Yes
No
5. Investigation Team
5.1 The extent of incidents and near-misses varies, and affects the need,
size and structure of the investigation team. Please specify the
way incidents and near-misses are classified in your plant, and the
way it affects the structure of the team:
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
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Table 3-6. (continued)
_______________________________________________________________________________
5.2 Are off-site members included in your investigation team?
Yes
No
5.3 Are representatives of the local community and of regulatory agencies
involved in the investigations of near-misses and incidents that
might effect the population in this community?
No
Yes
If yes, please specify: ______________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
5.4 There are several major objectives of PSII. Please check those that
are the responsibility of the investigation team:
Identify system related multiple root causes
Determine recommendations and actions to be taken to prevent
recurrence of incidents and similar events
Implement the recommendations
Follow up on the recommendations
5.5 Are PSII training and refresher training conducted on a regular
basis?
No
Yes
If yes, which of the following groups are subjected to this
training:
Senior management
Mid-level management,
First line supervisors, etc.
5.6 Specify who are mainly appointed as team leaders in PSII:
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
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Table 3-6. (continued)
_______________________________________________________________________________
5.7 Are recommendations on disciplinary actions in the scope of the PSII
team?
Yes
No
6. Evidence
6.1 Physical evidence is required for two distinct phases: the immediate
and the long-term. Does the PSII procedure in your plant address
storage for evidence:
No
One central storage area is dedicated for short and long-term
evidence storage
Long-term evidence is storage appropriately if required
6.2 Among the early stages of the implementation of a PSII procedure is
the establishment of a protocol of systematic identification of all
the expected evidence, and a coding system for this evidence.
Does the PSII procedure in your plant develop such a protocol and
coding system?
No
Develop a protocol for identification of evidence only
Develop a coding system only
Yes, both
6.3 Does the PSII procedure in your plant consist of a procedure for
document Control?
No
Yes
if yes, does the size and scope of investigation mandate the
extent of the documentation?
No
Yes
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Table 3-6. (continued)
____________________________________________________________________________________
6.4 Does the PSII procedure in your plant call for simulations and re-
creations in cases of gaps or contradictions of information?
Yes
No
7. Recommendations
7.1. In this stage preventive action is developed and examined for each of the root causes.
Evaluation of the selected preventive actions for Management of Change (MOC) at
this stage can save time and effort if the preventive action under
investigation does not satisfy the MOC program criteria. Which
of the following applies in your plant?
Evaluation for MOC is conducted at this stage
Evaluation for MOC is conducted only at the last stage
before implementation of the preventive actions
The PSII procedure does not address MOC.
Other: _______________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
7.2 Does the PSII procedure in your plant require establishing criteria for
restart and operations following an incident investigation?
Yes
No
7.3 Does the PSII procedure in your plant call for improvement that aims
for inherently safe design?
Yes
No
7.4 Do regulatory agencies have jurisdiction and authority over restarts
following incidents in your plant?
Yes
No
If yes, please specify: ________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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Table 3-6. (continued)
____________________________________________________________________________________
7.5 Presentation and review of the recommendations with the area
management responsible for the operation of the line that experienced
the incident can be extremely beneficial. Is such a session required
by the PSII procedure in your plant?
Yes
No
7.6 Does the PSII procedure in your plant aim to examine the validity of
your emergency plan?
Yes
No
7.7 Please describe the incident classification criteria employed in your plant:
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
8. Metrics
8.1 Have you developed a program to measure PSII effectiveness?
Yes
No
8.2 Did you develop your own metrics or adapted them from other sources?
Developed own metrics
Adapted metrics from other sources
8.3 Please describe any general impressions of the PSII procedure at
your plant, portions of this program that are causing difficulty,
suggestion to improve the efficiency of the PSII program, etc.
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
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Summary
The Benchmarking of Process Safety Incident Investigation questionnaire
addresses the general approach to PSII, PSII techniques, use of databases, management
commitment to PSII, investigation team, evidence, recommendations following the
investigation, overall perception, and quality control. The questionnaire is designed to
identify how major themes are addressed in the implementation PSII procedures.
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CHAPTER IV
USE OF INCIDENT DATA COLLECTION FROM VARIOUS SOURCES FOR
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
Introduction
A large amount of information exists about industrial incidents. Many federal
and local agencies maintain data collection systems; however, databases have no value
without development of data analysis systems. Data mining is the most convenient way
to explore databases. Unlike data mining applications for marketing purposes, in process
safety management it is extremely important to verify the correlation between the
variable and the target variable, since the cost of error is often human life. Indicators
have been found to be the most convenient way to explore incident databases. Indicators,
if developed correctly, allow tracking of single variables along the time axis and
identifying trends. Using indicators creates the opportunity to identify the effects of
introduction of new technologies, new standards, regulation changes, and policy changes
on safety performance.
Although the literature specifies large number and types of indicators
[4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11], these indicators can be grouped as follows:
• Leading indicators - Leading indicators are upstream measures indicating
whether a process is in control. In the safety universe leading indicators
measure activities to diagnose problems and indicate corrective action. The
Management of Change index in chapter II is an example of a leading
indicator.
• Trailing indicators - Trailing measures result from events in the working
environment, and usually have a negative connotation. Number of incidents,
number of injuries, number of fatalities, number of hospitalizations, number
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of evacuations, property loss, and production down times are typical trailing
indicators.
The assessment in this study is based on incidents-related databases, which are
downstream records (i.e., trailing indicators). This chapter presents a methodology of
integrating and harnessing various sources of incident data collection to assess industrial
safety performance. The methodology was applied to data on the propane industry in
1998. A comparison of the contribution of using this methodology to the contribution of
using the “best”single source of data is being conducted as well. This study was
conducted in two phases:
First phase, an establishment of Criteria: the framework for the study is
established in this phase. The phase consists of several sections as follows:
• Determining the scope of products
• Definitions regarding what type of incidents should be excluded
• Definitions regarding the indicators that will be used
• Analysis of usefulness of incident data sources
• Development of a data integration procedure for each one of the sources
• Establishment of database structure
• Development of a procedure for identification of duplicates
• Development of a procedure for estimation of the total number of propane
incidents nationwide
Second phase, an assessment of data for 1998: This phase begins with initial
identification and assessment of all databases that contain propane incident information.
The data from 1998 were filtered, vetted, analyzed, and incorporated into a consolidated
database. The propane incident data from the consolidated database was then analyzed
to identify patterns and distribution of incidents. A survey that was originally designed
to extrapolate NFIRS numbers in order to help estimate the total number of propane
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incidents nationwide revealed several interesting findings which are presented later in
the report.
Definitions
Incidents
In order to accomplish the objectives of this study, many databases were
reviewed to establish criteria for database analysis. In order to conduct a meaningful
review of the existing databases, it is needed to establish specific criteria and definitions.
This section provides the definitions, reasoning, and limitations for analysis of the
databases to assess propane safety in the United States and create a baseline from which
to measure performance of other years in the future.
The following definition of incident was used for the Propane Incident Data
Collection study: “An incident is an unplanned or unintentional event or exposure to
propane, liquefied petroleum gas, LPG, propylene, normal butane, isobutene, or
butylenes
5
that caused or reasonably could have caused a release, death, injury,
evacuation, sheltering in place, environmental damage or property damage”. The
definition requires several sub-definitions as follows:
• Death: Incident resulting in a fatality
• Injury: Incident resulting in medical treatment beyond simple first aid, loss of
consciousness, or diagnosis of a condition or illness by a physician to either a
company employee or to the general public
• Evacuation: Incident resulting in a recommendation to vacate the area issued
by the emergency authority having jurisdiction
• Environmental Damage: Incident resulting in acute or chronic effects to
sensitive ecosystems, migration routes, vulnerable natural areas, or critical
habitats of threatened or endangered species
5
Products in this definition will be referred to as propane in this document
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• Property Damage: Incident resulting in either onsite or offsite physical
damage to property
The database consists of a large number of fields. These fields are divided into
two groups: (1) major fields- parameters that are used in the study; and (2) auxiliary
fields – parameters required for integration of databases and other procedures. These
fields are not parameters in the study (The zip codes field is an example of an auxiliary
field.) A list of the major fields is given in Appendix C. The following is a list of
indicators that are used in the analysis stage:
• Number of incidents
• Number of fatalities
• Number of injuries
• Number of fires
• Number of explosions
• Number of evacuations, and
• Property damage
The values of these indicators were measured in several domains:
• Equipment involved
• Vehicle involved
• Structure involved, and
• Cause of incidents.
A major advantage in using indicators is the opportunity to identify trends
through several years. However, the advantage of this process could not be implemented
because data required for implementation of the methodology was available for only
1998.
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Near-Misses
The scope of Phases I and II does not include the collection of near-misses. It is
difficult to conduct investigations on past incidents with severe consequences, and
nearly impossible to conduct such investigations for near-misses.
Inclusion of Incidents
For the purposes of this study, incidents that are included are as follows:
• Incidents where one or more of the following products were involved:
1. Propane
2. Liquefied Petroleum Gas
3. Propylene
4. Butane
5. Butene
6. Butylene
• Incidents where one of the above products was present even if not released or
ignited
• Incidents where one of the above products was involved even if it was not the
first material ignited
• Railroad incidents
• Pipeline incidents
• Propane-related incidents, where carbon monoxide was involved
• Incidents where propane was used as a propellant
• Intentional inhalation of product (i.e., huffing)
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Sources of Information and Data Integration
Review of Sources of Data
A thorough analysis of existing databases that collect information on industrial
incidents was conducted. As shown in Table 4-1, fifteen databases from ten sources were
integrated. These databases were selected because they contain information that could
be used to establish metrics for the propane industry.
Table 4-1. Sources of information and databases
Source Database Usefulness
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)
National Fire Information Reporting
System (NFIRS)
Very
U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC)
• National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System (NEISS)
• Death Certificates
• Investigation Summary
• Incident Summary
Very
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety
Center (MKOPSC)
News Clipping Database Very
Propane Gas Associations State of Iowa
State of Florida
Marginal
State Agencies State of Texas Very
National Response Center (NRC) Incident Reporting Information System
(IRIS)
Marginal
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Table 4-1. (continued)
Source Database Usefulness
US Department of Health and
Human Services, The Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry
Hazardous Substances Emergency Events
Surveillance (HSEES)
Marginal
U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT)
• Hazardous Material Incident
• Reporting System (HMIRS)
Integrated Pipeline Information
• System (IPIS) also known
as Hazardous Liquid Accident
Data (HLAD).
Moderate
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)
Risk Management Program (RMP)
5-year Accident History
Marginal
U.S. Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA)
Accident Investigation System Marginal
The following tables provide an overview of the sources and the databases. The
overview includes:
• Information on the covered universe, which explains what type of facilities must
report and what regulation mandates the gathering of the data;
• Collection method, which explains how the agency gathers the required
information;
• Principal data elements of the database that provide a brief description of the type
of data found in the database;
• Strengths of the database; and
• Weaknesses of the database.
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Table 4-2 consists of an overview of the US Fire Administration database, the
National Fire Information Reporting System (NFIRS):
Table 4-2. An overview of NFIRS
Covered Universe
In 1974 the USFA was authorized to gather data on US fire
incidents. About 2 million incidents are collected annually from
about 14,000 fire and emergency departments. The National
Directory of Fire Chiefs and Emergency Department is the most
updated list of fire departments in the US. This list consists of about
29,000 fire departments and about 6,900 emergency departments.
About 39% of these departments are currently reporting to NFIRS
from 42 states. This source consists of a large number of propane
related incidents (~2,800 for 1998)
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Table 4-2. (continued)
Collection
Method
Fire and emergency departments report on events that required their
involvement. Some of the departments report directly to the system,
others report to the state fire marshal, and his office submits the
information to NFIRS.
Principal Data
Elements
Data collected on incidents for this database include the following:
• Time and date
• Address
• Consequences
• Damage estimation
• Material involved
• Fire/emergency department details
• Location categories
• Number of emergency personnel in the site
• Equipment involved
• Causes
Strengths
NFIRS is a very extensive data collection source for propane
incidents. It is able to capture a large amount of data, and includes a
very detailed location code. The damage estimation is quite unique.
Weaknesses
Even though NFIRS consists of a large number of incidents, it fails
to capture many of the most significant incidents, and therefore is
not as comprehensive as it might seem.
Table 4-3 consists of an overview of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) database, the National Electronic Injuries Surveillance System
(NEISS):
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Table 4-3. An overview of NEISS
Covered Universe
For nearly 30 years the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) has operated a statistically valid injury surveillance and
follow-up system known as the National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System (NEISS). The primary purpose of NEISS has
been to provide timely data on consumer product-related injuries
occurring in the U.S.
Collection
Method
The data collection process begins when a patient is admitted to the
emergency department (ED) of a NEISS hospital. An ED staff
member elicits critical information as to how the injury occurred
and enters that information in the patient' s medical record.
At the end of each day, a NEISS hospital coordinator reviews all
ED records for the day, selecting those that meet the (current)
criteria for inclusion in NEISS. The NEISS coordinator abstracts
pertinent data from the selected ED record and transcribes it in
coded form to a NEISS coding sheet using rules described in a
NEISS Coding Manual.
Principal Data
Elements
The database consists of date, product, and text description of the
incidents and consequences.
Strengths
The strength of the NEISS database is the fact that a text is
available. Also it is statistically valid and can be extrapolated. The
quality of the data can be partly attributed to the fact that trained
professionals gather data.
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Table 4-3. (continued)
Weaknesses
The major weakness of the NEISS database is that neither location
of the incident nor time of day is available. These facts make the
identification of duplicates between NEISS and other sources
virtually impossible.
Through the courtesy of CPSC, we received pre-selected data from three
additional databases:
• Incident File: This is a collection of incidents gathered by CPSC on an informal
basis from news sources and from reports by individuals, health care workers,
agencies, and others.
• Death Certificate File: State health departments provide these death certificate
files to CPSC where consumer products are found to be involved in the deaths.
The Clearinghouse provides summaries of the death certificates with victim
information removed.
• In-Depth Investigations (INDP) File: The INDP file contains summaries of
reports of investigations into events surrounding product-related injuries or
incidents. Based on victim/witness interviews, the reports provide details about
incident sequence, human behavior, and product involvement.
However, information on the databases is poor, and therefore these sources could
not be reviewed completely.
Table 4-4 consists of an overview of the MKOPSC news clippings database:
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Table 4-4. An overview of the MKOPSC news clippings database
Covered Universe
The MKOPSC news clipping database is a collection of incidents
from newspaper databases. These databases are a survey of large
number of newspapers nationwide. Following is a list of sources:
• “Pay -Per-View”Archival Services:
1. NewsLibrary.com
2. NorthernLight.com
• Free – Real Time sources:
1. Google
2. AltaVista
Collection
Method
Collection methods vary somewhat among the sources. The archival
sources present a short description of the clipping. Cases that are of
interest are purchased/downloaded. Information was extracted from
the sources and entered into the News Clipping database. The free
real-time sources gather articles from a much larger number of
sources but only retain information for about 30 days. Google
searches more than 4,000 sources.
Principal Data
Elements
The news-clipping database consists of several fields as well as an
area for text descriptions. The information that is extracted is input
to the following fields:
• Name and address of facility, company or dealer
• Date of incident
• Fatalities, injuries, hospitalizations, evacuations, and
sheltering
• Distribution of the above among employees, contractors
and general public
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Table 4-4. (continued)
Principal Data
Elements
(continued)
• Number of response units in the incident site
• Release location
• Nature of release
• Cause
• Material involved, and
• State of material released
Strengths
The news clipping procedure has several strengths:
• News clipping provides real-time information that can be
used to follow up on incidents. However, this option is
applicable to real-time data collection and not for 1998.
• Quite often the name of the local responder, investigator, or
reporter is available.
• Allows direct contact to gain or confirm information, obtain
investigative reports, etc. (Again, valid only for real-time
incident data collection and not for 1998)
Gives text description of what happened
• Focuses on notable incidents
• Not just fires and explosions, but includes some near-misses
as well
• Internet search getting better with time
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Table 4-4. (continued)
Weaknesses
• Information can be inaccurate or ambiguous
• Some of the sources retain the information for a short period
of time
• Converting news clipping to electronic form requires
extensive human resources
Table 4-5 consists of an overview of the Department of Transportation - the
Hazardous Material Incidents Reporting System (HMIRS):
Table 4-5. An overview of HMIRS
Covered Universe
The Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) of
the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) was
established in 1971 to fulfill the requirements of the federal
hazardous materials transportation law. The law requires incident
reporting of carriers of hazardous materials. All spills meeting the
following criteria are reported to the RSPA:
As a direct result of hazardous materials a person is killed or
receives injuries requiring hospitalization, or estimated property
damage exceeds $50,0 00, or an evacuation of the general public
lasts for one or more hours, or a major transportation artery or
facility is closed for one or more hours, or the operational flight
pattern or routing of an aircraft is altered.
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Table 4-5. (continued)
Covered Universe
(continued)
1. Fire, breakage, spillage, or suspected contamination occurs
involving shipment of radioactive materials or infectious
substances
2. There is a release of a marine pollutant exceeding 450 L or 400
kg, or
3. Any hazardous material is unintentionally released from a
package or any quantity of hazardous waste is discharged during
transportation.
All modes of transportation are included except pipeline and bulk
marine transportation.
Collection
Method
Reported by carriers’owner.
Principal Data
Elements
HMIRS database consists of 114 fields. The followings are some of
the fields that are relevant to the Propane Incident Data Collection
Project:
• Carriers’information
• Carriers’Damage
• Cause
• Product
• Decontamination costs
• Destination
• Fires, explosions
• Consequences
• Loss of Product costs
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Table 4-5. (continued)
Strengths
Information is detailed and generally of good quality since the
carriers are required to report within 30 days and they are
knowledgeable of their business
Weaknesses
No data is provided for incidents where the consequences are below
the thresholds.
Table 4-6 consists of an overview of the Department of Transportation – the
integrated Pipeline Information System (IPIS) or (Hazardous Liquid Accident Data):
Table 4-6. An overview of IPIS
Covered Universe
Data includes releases of natural gas or petroleum/petroleum by-
products that meet reporting requirements as outlined in 49 CFR
Parts 191, 192, and 195. The Hazardous Liquid Accident Data is the
database that reports all incidents except the ones involving natural
gas.
Collection
Method
Reports on incidents are required to be submitted to the Office of
Pipeline Safety by the responsible operators within 30 days of the
incident to avoid penalties.
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Table 4-6. (continued)
Principal Data
Elements
IPIS database consists of 62 fields. The following is part of the
information that is being collected:
• Information on operator
• Date and time of incident
• Location
• Origin of release (valve, scraper, trap, pump, welding,
girth…)
• Pipeline production year
• Cause
• Fatalities and injuries of employees as well as non-
employees
• Property damage
• Commodity classification
• Fire/explosions involved
• Operating information
• Corrosion information
• Several text fields
Strengths
• Most of the incidents that meet the reporting requirement are
submitted.
• People that report are from the industry, which helps
improve data accuracy.
Weaknesses Incidents under the reporting thresholds are not captured.
Table 4-7 consists of an overview of the National Response Center (NRC), the
Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) Database.
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Table 4-7. An overview of IRIS
Covered Universe
IRIS contains data on reported releases from fixed facilities, marine,
offshore facilities, pipelines, and transportation vehicles. Many
federal statutes require reporting of releases to the National
Response Center (NRC).
Pipeline spills are reported under the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Safety Act.
Air releases are reported under:
• Clean Air Act;
• Toxic Substances Control Act;
• Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Laws; and
• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
Collection
Method
This database is used primarily for emergency response notification
and is operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The initial
notification of a release is usually by telephone. These reports are
comprised of mostly short answer questions.
Principal Data
Elements
The database contains data on oil, chemical, biological, and
etiological discharges into the environment anywhere in the United
States or its territories. The NRC collects information nationally on
reports of hazardous material releases as well as releases of
hazardous substances and oil from fixed facility and transportation
incidents. The information consists of location of the release,
owner’s details, a short description of the incident, and the
information related to the consequences (affected medium,
fatalities, injuries, evacuations, cost of damages) of the incident.
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Table 4-7. (continued)
Strengths
NRC handles approximately 30,000 telephone calls each year, of which
approximately 25,000 are unique incidents.
Weaknesses
Because this system contains initial reports, the information is
preliminary and therefore in many cases inaccurate or incomplete.
There also is duplicate reporting of incidents. Propane incidents at
residents and small businesses are seldom reported.
Table 4-8 consists of an overview of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) – the RMP 5-year Accident History Database.
Table 4-8. An overview of EPA RMP
Covered Universe
Risk Management Program covered facilities that have released a
listed substance, which is stored above a threshold quantity and
results in fatalities, injuries, or significant environmental or property
damage, are required to report 5-year accident histories. It covers
about 15,000 facilities from 1994 to 1999. Propane stored for use as
a fuel is generally excluded.
Collection
Method
5-year Accident History Report
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Table 4-8. (continued)
Principal Data
Elements
RMP facility must provide EPA with the following information for
each incident:
• Date, time, and approximate duration of the release;
• Chemical(s) released;
• Estimated quantity released in pounds;
• Type of release event and its source;
• Weather conditions, if known;
• Onsite impacts;
• Known off-site impacts;
• Initiating event and contributing factors, if known;
• Whether off-site responders were notified, if known; and
• Operational or process changes that resulted from
investigation of the release.
Strengths
The reports do address such items as the causes and consequences
of the release and steps taken to prevent or mitigate future incidents.
Reporters are trained in incident investigation, and therefore records
are quite accurate.
Weaknesses
Most of the incidents are probably not odorized propane but
propane mixtures in chemical processes.
Table 4-9 consists of an overview of the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR), the Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance
(HSEES) Database.
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Table 4-9. An overview of HSEES
Covered Universe
Sixteen state health departments currently have cooperative
agreements with ATSDR to participate in HSEES. The state health
departments report an “event” if it meets the HSEES definition,
which is “any release(s) or threatened release(s) of at least one
hazardous substance”. A substance is considered hazardous if it
might reasonably be expected to cause adverse human health
effects. Releases of petroleum products (including propane) are
excluded from this system unless mixed with another chemical.
Collection
Method
Data are entered by participating state health departments into a
Web-based application that enables ATSDR to access data instantly
for analysis.
Principal Data
Elements
Data collected on incidents for this database include the following:
• Time, date, and day of the week;
• Geographical location within the facility where the event
occurred;
• Event type (fixed-facility or transportation-related event);
• Factors contributing to the release;
• Environmental sampling and follow-up health activities;
• Specific information on injured persons: age, sex, type and
extent of injuries, distance from spill, population group
(employee, general public, responder, student), and type of
protective equipment used;
• Information about decontaminations, evacuation, or shelter-
in-place;
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Table 4-9. (continued)
Principal Data
Elements
(continued)
Land use and population information to estimate the number of
persons at home or work who were potentially exposed; and
whether a contingency plan was followed and which plan was used.
Participating States: Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin
Strengths
ATSDR has a proactive approach to incident collection that
facilitates more complete and accurate reporting. This source
consists of more details on type of injury and personal protective
equipment than many other sources.
Weaknesses
The ATSDR HSEES program covers only 16 states, and excludes
petroleum products unless other products (non-petroleum) are
involved.
Table 4-10 consists of an overview of the propane associations and State Agencies:
Table 4-10. An overview of Propane Gas Associations and State Agencies
Covered Universe
State Propane Gas Associations were established in order to conduct
business in a safe and ethical manner, and to encourage
professionalism and excellence.
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Table 4-10. (continued)
Collection
Method
There is no common procedure for data collection among the states.
The Texas Propane Gas Association does not collect incident report.
However, the Railroad Commission requests the propane companies
and dealers to submit incident investigation reports. The Texas
Railroad Commission keeps hard copies (only) of its reports. The
information was converted to electronic form by TAMU. Iowa
Propane Gas Association does not perform incident investigations.
Iowa’s d atabase consists of data that is collected from newspapers.
Florida’s Propane Gas association procedure is similar to that of
Texas.
Principal Data
Elements
Texas Railroad Commission database is the most detailed database
among the three. The database consists of several fields. Following
is the information that is collected:
• Company details and license number
• Location
• Fatalities and injuries
• Information on installation and equipment involved
• Container details
• Causes, and
• Text field for incident summary
Florida and Iowa databases consist of fewer details compared to
Texas.
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Table 4-10. (continued)
Strengths
States that conduct investigations provide a very detailed
description on the incidents and are very useful toward
incorporation in the propane incident database.
Information from three state associations contains more than a
hundred incidents. The potential of extracting information from the
majority of the state associations could significantly contribute to
the comprehensiveness of the database. Texas data provides a good
means for assessing incidents directly associated with propane
industry facilities.
Weaknesses
States that are collecting information from diverse sources are hard
to assess. The fact that associations from different states are
collecting information in diverse ways requires development and
implementation of several procedures in order to incorporate the
data in the database.
Summary of Usefulness of the Sources
Data sources were analyzed in several dimensions in order to consolidate the
propane incident data into a single database. Table 4-11 ranks the sources as a function
of the contribution a source of information makes with regard to the relevant dimension.
The range of potential contribution has been divided to three sub regimes: Low,
Reasonable (Reas.), and High.
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Table 4-11. Summary of usefulness of sources
NFIRS: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significance of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
CPSC Databases: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significance of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
MKOPSC News Clipping Database: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significance of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
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Table 4-11. (continued)
HMIRS: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significance of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
IPIS: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significance of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
IRIS: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significance of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
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Table 4-11. (continued)
EPA RMP: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significance of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
HSEES: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significant of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
Associations and State Agencies Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significance of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
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Table 4-11. (continued)
NEISS: Low Reas. High
Number of incidents ν
Comprehensiveness of data ν
Opportunity for information validation ν
Significant of data ν
Data accuracy ν
Opportunity for nationwide estimation ν
Table 4-11 ranks the databases according to several dimensions. The table
distinguishes between masses of data and significance of data. Finally, this table presents
the opportunities and limitations that exist in the different data collection procedures,
with regard to the assessment of safety performance of the propane industry by
collecting incident data from various sources. The information flows from the reporters /
agencies / newspapers etc. as illustrated in Figure 4-1:
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Coast
Guard
Responders All Agencies Public
Companies
IRIS National
Response center
Health
records
News
Media
Fire
Depts.
DOT Propane Gas
Associations
HSEES
CPSC
OSHA
EPA
RMP
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HMIRS IPIS
Databases
Surveys
Databases
Databases
Reports
NEISS
Incident
Summary
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Certificate
Injuries
Filtering, Vetting, Merging, Translation, Duplicates Removal
Database
Figure 4-1. Information flow chart
139
Method of Duplication Identification and Removal
There are two categories of duplications that is encountered during the
consolidation of propane incident information from a variety of sources:
• Duplications within the sources
• Duplications among different sources
Define time window for
duplication identification
Create a list of records
with similar
geographic information
within the time frame.
Compare # of
fatalities, injuries
and other
description.
Same?
Do records in the given time
frame have similar
geographic information?
Mark records as
non-duplicates
No
No
Yes
Add to
“Suspected As
Duplications”
list
Figure 4-2. Procedure for identification of duplication
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In general, it is much easier to identify duplications within the sources as
compared to identifying duplications amongst different sources. However, the process
of identification of duplications is similar in both cases. Duplication within the same
source has the same type of information and is much easier to identify. The duplication
identification process is illustrated in Figure 4-2.
The number of records in the list of ‘Suspected as Duplications’is sensitive to
the time frame that is employed. However, in order to verify that the time frame used is
not arbitrary, the sensitivity of duplication number to the time frame was studied.
Figure 4-3 demonstrates the number of records in the ‘Suspected as Duplications’
list for various time frames. As Figure 4-3 reveals, the number of incidents that are
suspected as duplications is highly correlated with the width of the time frame (root
mean square value of more then 0.98). The slope of the correlated line may serve as a
qualitative relative indicator for the comprehensiveness of the database. Under the
estimation that the probability of an incident to occur is not time dependent, the number
of suspected duplication in a given time frame would increase as the portion of the
universe of incidents increases.
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Figure 4-3. Sensitivity to time frame study
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Once the system creates a list of records that are suspected as duplications, they
are eliminated from the consolidated database. Identification of duplicates becomes
quite difficult in cases where time of incident is not given.
As for duplicate identification within the databases, the process of verification of
whether incidents are duplications varies according to characteristics of the incidents.
NFIRS for an example consists of two types of duplications:
1) Fire department that reported the incident more than once.
2) Incidents that were suspected as duplicates, because more than a single fire
department entered reports.
In the first case, the verification process was not complicated. In the second
case, however, it was required to search the Internet for county maps in order to
determine if it is reasonable that a fire department from an adjacent county would assist
another fire department and also report to NFIRS. In all of the cases the distance
between the counties was too far to assume that the reports are duplicates.
An important criterion for identifying duplications is the number of injuries and
fatalities. If two incidents that have other similar characteristics also show exactly the
same number of fatalities and injuries, there is a high likelihood that one of these
incidents is a duplicate. The system ignored incidents that have different number of
injuries or fatalities. A manual check and quality control procedure to ensure that
duplicates were identified accurately and that non-duplicates were not eliminated
inadvertently was applied. A thorough examination of incidents with fatalities revealed
that the automated procedure for duplication identification was able to capture
approximately 75% of the duplications among these incidents. Several of the incidents
had the same values in all fields (including textual description of the incidents),
however, several months gap in the time field prevented these duplications from being
revealed. The procedure for duplication identification should be improved further, to
increase its capabilities.
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As for duplications amongst different databases, the process required relatively
more extensive efforts, and each of the cases needed to be treated separately, in addition
to using the procedure. Table 4-12 summarizes the number of duplications identified in
the 1998 database:
Methodology for Estimation of Total Number of Propane Incidents in the United
States
Background
The process for estimating the total number of propane incidents in the Unites
States can be explained by the theory of sets. Figure 4-4 illustrates the current situation.
The gray area represents the total number of propane-related incidents in the US. The
white areas represent the actual number of incidents in each of the respective databases.
NFIRS
RMPNews clippings
HMIRS
IPIS
HSEES
NEISS
NRC
States
Figure 4-4. Illustration of current situation
Universe
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Table 4-12. Duplications amongst different sources
NFIRS Florida HMIRS NRC News Iowa
Death
Cert.
Incident
CPSC
IPIS Texas
Investigation
CPSC
NEISS
NFIRS 2 2 1 1 2 17 4 1
Florida 1 2
HMIRS 18 2 1
NRC 1 5
News 1 4 1
Iowa
Death
CPSC
3 5
Incident
CPSC
21
IPIS
Texas
Investigation
CPSC
2
NEISS
The number of incidents from each of the databases is a subset of the total
number of incidents that this database could consists of (the set), e.g., NFIRS consists of
records from about 14,000 emergency departments from 42 states. The records in NFIRS
are a subset of a set, which is the number of records that NFIRS would consist of if all
29,000 fire departments as well 6,900 emergency departments from the 50 states
reported every propane incident to NFIRS. Figure 4-5 is an illustration of the relation
between set and a subset.
The Universe is a collection of all incidents that have the potential to be reported.
Therefore, Universe is a composition of sets. The translation of the above to the theory
of set language is as follows:
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a1 - is current records in database DB1
A1 - is the potential number of record in the database DB1, if all incidents targeted by
this database were reported.
a1 is a subset of A1  a1 ⊂ A1
a2 - is current number of records in database DB2
A2 - is the potential number of record in the database DB2, if all incidents targeted by
this database were reported.
a2 is a subset of A2  a2 ⊂ A2
The same principles applies to a3, a4,……, an or all the databases.
The Universe S is a composition of all the sets. However, there are overlaps
among the sets, and therefore U is a union of the sets, as Figure 4-6 illustrates.
S = (U Ai) =A1∪ A2∪ A3∪…∪ An= (4-1)
Set A
Subset a
Figure 4-5. Relation between a set and a subset
n
i=1
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i=1
n
i=1 j>i
n n-1
= ∑Ai - ∑ ∑ (Ai∩Aj) - ∑ ∑ ∑ (Ai∩Aj∩Ak)- ... - (Ai∩Aj∩…∩An)
No duplications found between more than two sources. Therefore, only the first
two parts of equation 4-1 will be employed for the estimation purposes. These two parts
are extended and are presented in equation 4-2.
Figure 4-6. Our universe is defined to be a union of the sets (Venn Diagram)
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
S
A1∪ A2
A2∪ A3∪ A5
n-1 n-2 n-3
i=1 j>i k>j
The sum of the number of
duplicates between every
combination of pairs of
databases
The sum of the number
of multiplications among
every combination of
three databases
The number of
multiplication that
appeared in all of
the databases
The sum of incidents from
all databases prior to
applying duplication
identification procedure
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S= A1+ A2+ A3+ .+ An - [(A1∩ A2 + A1∩ A3 + +A 1∩ An) + (4-2)
+ (A2∩ A3+ A2∩ A4 +…+A2∩ An)] +…+ (A(n-1) ∩ An)]
The sequence of estimating the universe S is now simplified. The information
that is available currently is the subsets ai and the intersection between these subsets.
Figure 4-7 presents the sequence of obtaining the information required to solve
equation 4-2.
Following are descriptions of the processes of extrapolating the sets Ai according
to the characteristics of each of the sources. The assumptions that were required in order
Extract subsets ai
from database
Extrapolate
Sets Ai
Study the
characteristics of
each of the sources
Extrapolate
intersections among
sets
Solve
equation 2
Collect information
on intersections
between subsets
Figure 4-7. Sequence of estimation of universe S
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to extrapolate the intersections between the sets will be presented later, as well as the
results from substituting the information in equ ation 2.
Extrapo lation s of Sets Ai
The purpose of collection of information is not the same for all the sources, and
therefore the characteristics of each of these sources should be incorporated in order to
calculate the number of incidents that the source database would consist of if it were to
capture all the incidents that belong in its category. The considerations, as well as the
methods for extrapolating the information of the sets, Ai, are as follows. Table 4-13
consists of the number of incidents that each of the sources contributed to the
consolidated database.
Table 4-13. Number of incidents from the various sources
Source Number of Incidents
RMP 32
NFIRS 2,805
Florida 58
HMIRS 96
NRC 146
News 99
Iowa 8
Death - CPSC 31
Incident - CPSC 190
IPIS 12
Texas 55
HSEES 35
Investigation - CPSC 70
NEISS 184
OSHA Excerpt 1
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CPSC - National Electronic Incidents Surv eillance System
“ For
6
 nearly 30 years the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
has operated a statistically valid injury surveillance and follow-back system known as
the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS). The primary purpose of
NEISS has been to provide timely data on consumer product-related injuries occurring in
the U.S. In the year 2000, CPSC initiated an expansion of the system to collect data on
all injuries. With the expansion, NEISS becomes an important public health research
tool, not just for CPSC, but also for users throughout the U.S. and around the world. The
NEISS injury data are gathered from the emergency departments of 100 hospitals
selected as a probability sample of all 5,300 U.S. hospitals with emergency departments.
The system's foundation rests on emergency department surveillance data, but the
system also has the flexibility to gather additional data at either the surveillance or the
investigation level.
The data collection process begins when a patient is admitted to the emergency
department (ED) of a NEISS hospital. An ED staff member elicits critical information as
to how the injury occurred and enters that information in the patient's medical record.
At the end of each day, a NEISS hospital coordinator reviews all ED records for
the day, selecting those that meet the (current) criteria for inclusion in NEISS. The
NEISS coordinator abstracts pertinent data from the selected ED record and transcribes
it in coded form to a NEISS coding sheet using rules described in a NEISS Coding
Manual.
Identifying the consumer product(s) related to the injury is crucial for CPSC. The
NEISS coordinator assigns a product code from an alphabetical listing of hundreds of
products and recreational activities, being as specific as the data allow. For example, if a
lawn mower were involved in an injury, the coordinator would use a different product
code for a walk-behind mower than for a riding mower. If the ED record contains
additional product detail, the coordinator includes that in a line or two of narrative text
(e.g., gasoline-powered rotary mower made by XYZ Company). The victim’s age,
6
Cited from CPSC Website http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/3002.html (September 2003).
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gender, injury diagnosis, body parts affected, and incident locale are among other data
variables coded. A brief narrative description of the incident is also included. Once the
abstracting and coding are completed, the NEISS coordinator enters the data for the
day’s NEISS injury cases into a personal computer provided by CPSC. As the
coordinator keys in data, CPSC-designed software interactively edit the data, requiring
that all fields be filled and allowing only acceptable entries”.
Since NEISS surveys sample of hospitals that represent all ethnic groups and
concentrations of population, it is statistically valid to extrapolate by multiplying the
number of propane-related incidents from NEISS by the ratio between the number of
hospitals in the U.S. (estimated as 5,300) and the number of hospitals in the survey
(100). The set of NEISS consists of the following number of incidents:
nationwide
incidents
database
thein
incidents
surveythein
hospitals
USthein
hospitals
nationwide
incidents N
N
N
N 572,9184
100
300,5
=•=•= (4-3)
Though NEISS has a potential of capturing large amount of data, it is not
additive to the rest of the numbers. The reason for that is that NEISS records do not
include location and time, and there is no way to estimate the number of duplicates
among other sources and NEISS. However, the estimation using the NEISS database
reveals that there were about 10,000 injuries from propane-related incidents.
Florida Propane Gas Association and Texas Railroad Commission
There is no common procedure for data collection among the states. However,
the Texas Railroad Commission requests the companies and dealers to submit incident
investigation reports. The Commission keeps hard copies (only) of its reports, which
was converted to electronic form for this study. The Iowa Propane Gas Association does
not perform incident investigations; its database consists of data that is collected from
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newspapers, and therefore was not used in this estimation. Florida’s’ Propane Gas
Association procedures are similar to those of Texas.
Since these incident collections are mainly from companies and dealers, it seems
that normalization to the non-industrial propane consumption rate will be representative.
The estimation procedure is shown in Figure 4-8.
The consumption data did not include the industrial consumption. Using
industrial consumption as well, would distort the results, e.g., Texas consumes
7
about
406,539 barrels. However, 393,652 barrels are used for industrial purpose, and only
12,900 barrels for other uses. Florida consumes 7,386 barrels total, but only 2,087
barrels for industrial needs and 5,299 barrels for all other needs. The estimation is that
collection of incidents from all propane gas associations/Railroad Commissions add up 
to 1,168 incidents associated with propane dealers.
NFIRS
The NFPA established a project for estimation of incidents in the United States.
NFIRS is a collection of reports from 35%-50% of fire departments from 42 states in the
US. The following should be kept in mind with regard to NFIRS and fire departments
reporting to NFIRS:
1. Large fire departments are usually staffed by paid full-time employees
2. Small (rural) fire departments are usually staffed by part-time volunteers
3. The probability of fire departments with paid employees reporting to NFIRS is
much greater than the probability of fire departments with volunteer employees
reporting to NFIRS.
4. Majority of propane incidents in relation to population size occurs in rural areas.
7
Consumption rates are available in the US Department of Energy Website:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/sep_fuel/html/fuel_lg.html
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NFPA conducted a survey of about 3,000 (~10% of the fire departments in the
US), in order to balance the data in NFIRS. The survey targeted rural areas mainly since
the reporting from these fire departments is low. By applying statistical analysis on
NFIRS information and the survey results, NFPA calculated the total number of propane
incidents in the United States. 10,780 LP Gas related incidents occurred in 1998 in the
US according to NFPA.
The estimations as well as number of incidents that cannot be estimated are
summarized in Table 4-14.
Gathering information
on states’ propane
consumption rates
Normalize information
from Texas to
consumption rate
Calculate average
number of incidents to
consumption rate from
Texas and Florida data
Normalize information
from Florida to
consumption rate
Use average number of
incidents to consumption rate,
and state’s consumption rates
to make national estimate
Figure 4-8. Extrapolating data from state agencies
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Table 4-14. Summary of estimations
Source Number of Incidents National Estimation
RMP 32 32
NFIRS 2,805 10,780
HMIRS 96 96
NRC 146 146
News 99 700
States 121 1,168
Death - CPSC 31 31
Incident - CPSC 190 190
IPIS 12 12
HSEES 35 96
Investigation - CPSC 70 70
OSHA 1 Lack of information
Total 13,321
Extrapolation of Duplicates
The ideal way to extrapolate the number of duplications is to sample several
sample size of sub-sets and to identify number of duplicates for combination of sizes. By
using this methodology it is possible to study how the number of duplications increases
with increase of the size of subsets. However, the database consists of relatively low
number of duplicates. Therefore, the extrapolation of the number of duplicates will be a
multiplication of the number of duplicates between sources by the ratio of the sum of the
extrapolated number of the incidents in the set and the sum of the actual number of
incidents in the database, as was demonstrated in equation 4-3 for NEISS. It should be
noted that in case of duplicates between NFIRS and CPSC incident reports, the
extrapolated number is greater then the number of incidents in CPSC incident reports
153
The total number of duplicates is 215 incidents. Substituting the extrapolated
number of incidents and extrapolated number of duplicates (NEISS numbers are
excluded) leads to a total number of 13,106 propane incidents in the United States in
1998.
Data Analysis and Pattern Identification
Overview
The database consists of 3,721 incidents that have been collected from a variety
of sources. There are records of 137 fatalities, and 1,012 injuries in the database.
Distribution of fatalities and injuries among the victim categories is given in Table 4-15.
Table 4-15. Distribution of fatalities and injuries
Victim Category Number of Fatalities Number of Injuries
General Public 122 740
Worker/
Contractors
8 95
Fire Fighters and
Public responders
2 126
Unknown 5 51
As Table 4-15 reveals, the general public is the most vulnerable population for
propane incidents. Figure 4-9 illustrates the distribution of fatalities as a function of the
cause of death. The fatality data consist of several types of causes. Explosions and
explosions that caused fatal burns are among these categories. It is hard to determine the
cause of death among the fatalities of explosions. Therefore these categories were
lumped together under explosions. In many cases, the description noted that fire was
involved. However, there was no way to figure out whether the victims died from burns,
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carbon monoxide poisoning, or smoke inhalation. In these cases, the cause of death was
assumed to be fire.
Explosions caused the highest number fatalities. Carbon monoxide poisoning is
the second leading cause of fatalities. The impression from the descriptions is that there
is a lack of awareness of what is to been done in order to reduce the hazard of carbon
monoxide poisoning while using propane for space heating. None of the reports
mentioned the existence of carbon monoxide detectors in the residences. Since incidents
in mobile homes are quite common (the database includes 161 incidents in mobile
homes and 69 incidents in recreational vehicles), standardizing installation of carbon
monoxide detectors may lead to the reduction of number of fatalities from carbon
monoxide poisoning. Number of fires and explosions in mobile homes is high, and leak
detectors, as well as shut-off valves might also lead to the reduction of these incidents.
Discussion of fatalities requires identification of whether there is certain age
range that is more vulnerable than other range of ages. Figure 4-10 demonstrates the
distribution of number of fatalities according to the ranges of age.
Figure 4-9. Fatalities by causes of death
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In 62% of the fatalities it was difficult or impossible to determine the age of the
victims. Although, in several of the cases the age could be assumed (like the huffing
cases, where the victims used plastic bags on their heads, which is more likely to
indicate that the victims were teenagers), if the ages of the victim were not clear in the
data, it was classified as unknown. With age unknown in 62% of cases no conclusions
could be drawn. We believe that this type of information may be available if real-time
data collection procedures are implemented, because it creates opportunities to
investigate the incidents.
Following are patterns and distributions of incidents and consequences with
regard to causes, equipment involved, vehicles, and structures. It is important to
emphasize that the values in the figures are actual values from the database, and are not
extrapolated.
Cause Analysis
Cause analysis is a difficult task even for experienced incident investigators.
Concerns arise with regard to causes that are reported by the general public (such as
NRC) and others who lack the tools that are required to correctly determine the cause.
8%
13%
11%
6%
62%
Unknown 0-20 21-50 51-70 Older then 70
Figure 4-10. Distribution of number of fatalities by age range
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In many cases the incident reports consist of description of situation, and it was
required to determine the cause from the textual description, which in several cases
could be interpreted to more than a single cause. Good practice and judgment were
applied in order to reduce the uncertainty. As shown in Figure 4-11, the leading cause is
“equipment failure.” The frequency of equipment failure is more than 3 times higher
than “improper procedures,” the next leading cause.
Surprisingly, “human error ”and “maintenance activity/inactivi ty”are among the
low frequency causes in term of number of incidents.
Among the incidents, equipment failure is the leading cause of fires, and of
explosions, as can be seen in Figure 4-12 and in Figure 4-13. Improper procedure is the
next major cause for fire and explosions. Human error, which is a major cause of
incidents in other industries, is found to be relatively insignificant as a cause of propane
incident. It must be noted though, the definition of equipment failure, human error, and
other causes is quite subjective and varies quite widely.
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Figure 4-11. Incidents by cause category
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While frequency of incidents is an important indicator, it is also essential to
analyze the consequences of incidents. As Figure 4-14 reveals, human error, which was
insignificant in terms of frequency of incidents, is a major concern as a cause of
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Figure 4-13. Explosions vs. cause
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fatalities. The large number of fatalities with unknown causes reflects the level of
ambiguity or lack of information that exists with regard to about one third of the
fatalities.
There is no single data source that mainly contributes to the “Unknown”.
Following are four examples of text descriptions that were difficult to use in determining
the cause of the incidents
8
:
• Attempting to light propane stove which then exploded-sequlae (?) of extensive
burns
• Subject was burned in a propane explosion at home – sepsis; Severe burns;
Exploding propane tank
• Lighting propane tank – Respiratory failure; Inhalation burns; Exploding propane
tank
• Victim of propane stove explosion (camper trailer) – Thermal and physical
injuries; Explosion of propane tank
8
The source of these examples is CPSC death certificates database
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Figure 4-14. Fatalities by cause
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As Figure 4-15 reveals, Equipment Failure and Improper Procedure are also the
leading causes for injuries. Human error is extremely significant as a cause for fatalities;
however, equipment failures and improper procedure contribute more to the number of
injuries in comparison to human error. It seems that maintenance activity/inactivity is
pretty much consistent, with regard to other causes, as a cause for incidents, fires,
fatalities and injuries.
As for damage costs, as Figure 4-16 demonstrates, equipment failures caused
about $25 million of the property damage. It is important to point out that property
damage in EPA RMP facilities is about $26 million, $15 million of which was caused by
equipment failure (in several of the incidents, equipment failure was not a single cause).
Figure 4-15. Injuries by cause
Unsuitable
Equipment
1%
Arson/Suspicious
1%
Other
1%
Process Design
Failure
1%
Maintenance
Activity/Inactivity
3%
Upset Condition
10%
Human Error
14%
Equipment Failure
21%
Improper Procedure
19%
Unknown
29%
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The intensity of equipment failure as leading cause for property damage would
be dramatically reduced, if RMP facilities (facilities that are covered under the EPA
RMP regulations) were not considered, as Figure 4-17 reveals. However, equipment
failure is still leading as a cause for property damage. Second to equipment failure as
leading cause is “upset conditions,” which caused about $20 million in property
damages. As with equipment failure, upset conditions caused about $11 million only in
EPA RMP facilities. Human error resulted in total damage costs of about $16 million, of
which $13 million was reported by RMP.
Figure 4-17 presents property damage costs where the property damage reported
by RMP facilities have been taken out. Equipment failure and upset conditions are still
leading as causes for property damage. Upset condition is followed very closely by
process design failure and improper procedures. Human error resulted in about $2
million dollars in damages for these non-RMP facilities.
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Figure 4-16. Property damage by cause
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As shown in Figure 4-18, if we disregard “unknown”as a cause, equipment
failure caused the highest number of population evacuations. One may suspect that EPA
RMP facilities have significant effect on evacuations as well; however, equipment
failures in RMP facilities caused fewer evacuations (127 employees) because of a
release of 8,500 pounds of butane at a petroleum refinery in Oregon (city), Ohio.
Unusual weather conditions in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with high velocity winds caused
a tree branch to fall and puncture a hole in a tank containing 45,000 pounds of propane
gas. As a result, 2,000 residents in the neighborhood were evacuated. Evacuations that
were caused by upset conditions are mainly evacuations because of incidents where
trucks and trains are involved. It is recommended that traffic incidents be separated from
upset condistions in future studies.
The majority of evacuations, where equipment failure was the cause, occurred
during connecting/disconnecting of hoses from delivery trucks.
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Figure 4-17. Property damage by cause (excluding RMP facilities)
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Summary of Cause Analysis
Incident consequences have several dimensions. Number of incidents versus
injuries, fatalities, damage costs, is a combination of frequency-severity that is being
used for prioritization process, risk assessments, and more.
Table 4-16. Severity levels
Severity
Level
Number of
Fatalities
Number of
Injuries
Number of
Incidents
Damage Costs
Millions
Level 1 No Fatalities Less than 50 Less than 500 Less than $5
Level 2 1- 10 51 – 100 501 – 1,000 $5 - $10
Level 3 11 – 20 101 – 150 1,001 – 1,500 $10 - $15
Level 4 21 – 30 151 – 200 1,501 – 2,000 $15 - $20
Level 5 More than 30 More than 200 More than 2,000 More than $20
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Figure 4-18. Evacuations by causes
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Following is a process of organizing the information in a way that helps in
visualizing the “contribution”of the variety of causes to the frequency and severity of
consequences. Table 4-16 assigns five levels of severity to the dimensions.
A level has been assigned to the cause categories for each one of the ranges
detailed in Table 4-16. Later the cause categories were ranked and arranged according to
the severity of their consequences. The results are presented in Table 4-17. As the figures
reveal, equipment failure and human error are the causes that led to the most severe
consequences. Equipment failure led to more injuries, incidents, and property damage.
Human error however, led to more than twice as many fatalities as equipment
failure and therefore should be ranked as the cause that led to the most severe
consequences. Improper procedure and upset conditions are responsible for severe
consequences as well, but less severe than the consequences of human error and
equipment failure. Other cause categories such as management error, process design
failure, maintenance activity/inactivity, unsuitable equipment, and arson/suspicious have
significant severe consequences as well but relatively fewer in number.
Table 4-17. Consequence severity of cause categories
Cause Category
Number of
Incidents
Number of
Fatalities
Number of
Injuries
Property
Damage
Equipment Failure 4 3 5 5
Human Error 1 5 4 4
Improper Procedure 2 3 5 2
Upset Condition 1 3 3 4
Management Error 1 1 1 3
Process Design Failure 1 2 1 2
Maintenance
Activity/Inactivity 1 2 1 1
Unsuitable Equipment 1 3 1 1
Arson/Suspicious 1 2 1 1
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Analysis of Incidents Involving Structures
About 500 categories of structures and locations exist in the database. The
structures and locations were adopted from NFIRS, and were grouped into 54 new
groups of categories in order to be able to analyze the data. Meaningful data is found
with regard to 15 of these groups. Charts in this chapter do not necessarily consist of all
groups, but only these that contribute more to the issue under discussion. Following is a
list of those 15 categories:
• Residences
• Recreational facilities
• General Areas, Street, Properties, and Roads
• Agricultural Facilities and Storage Areas
• Transportation Maintenance, Repair Shops, Manufacturing and Storage areas
• Distribution Systems for Gas, Water, Steam, and Electricity
• Highways
• Commercial Properties
• Entertainment Facilities
• Chemical Industry and Related Properties
• General Warehouses and other Unclassified Storage Areas
• Parking Areas
• LP Gas Bulk Plant
• Child Care and Aged Nursing
• Food Processing and Storage Areas
The distribution of fires and explosions according to the structure categories is
given in Figure 4-19 (note the logarithmic scale). As Figure 4-19 reveals, residences are
the most vulnerable locations for fires and explosions. About 62% of the fires, and 58%
of the explosions occurs in residences. About 13% of the fires and 6% of the explosions
occurred in General areas, which consist of the following:
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• Idle properties, vacant lots
• Unclassified construction and unoccupied property
• Open land, fields
• Dump, sanitary landfill
• Public mailbox
• Cemetery
• Unclassified outdoor properties
• Paved private streets, ways, roads and unpaved public streets.
In most of these incidents stove, heaters and lanterns within the recreational
vehicles or trailers initiated the incidents. It should be noted that trailers incidents are
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Figure 4-19. Fires and explosions by structure
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counted among the recreational facilities, and mobile homes are counted among
residencies.
In Recreational facilities, although the number of fires and explosions in these
facilities is low, these incidents had severe consequences. 23 fires and 18 explosions that
were captured by the database (In the majority of the explosions, fires were involved
too) resulted in 19 fatalities, as Figure 4-20 reveals. Most of the incidents occurred in
trailers while camping.
As for injuries, Residences outnumber all other structure categories. Commercial
Properties is a category that consists of many types of stores, and several other properties
such as laundries, home maintenance services, studios, and more. In a broad category
such as Commercial properties, as well as in Residences, large numbers of incidents,
injuries and fatalities could be expected. Commercial Properties had a large number of
Figure 4-20. Fatalities by structure
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injuries but a low number of fatalities. Since Commercial Properties are mainly operated
during daily hours, a developing incident may be noticed early enough and therefore the
severity of the consequences are reduced.
Figure 4-21 reveals significant number of injuries in Child Care and Old Age
Nursing structures. The majority of these injuries were exposure to carbon monoxide,
and in several cases, inhalation of propane.
The chemical and petrochemical sector are capital intensive industries. Thus,
incidents that involve fires and explosions cause significant damage costs, especially in
cases that shutdown time is long and loss of production costs are enormous. The large
number of fires and explosions in residences obviously led to extensive damage.
Distribution of damage costs by incidents in structures is shown in Figure 4-22.
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Summary of Structure Analysis
Residences is the structure category that suffers the most severe consequences,
probably because there are enomous number of residences in comparison to other
structures. Many fires and explosions occurred in general areas (which is a broad
category) however, the consequences are not as severe in comparison to other categories
such as Recreational Facilities, Commercial Properties, Food processing and Storage,
and Chemical Industry Facilities. Damage cost of Chemical industry are high, however,
most of the damage in this category have been reported, and the cost are quite well
evaluated. The food processing and storage areas suffers from a large property damage
however, the number of fatalities and injuries are low. This might be explained by the
fact these areas consist of capital intensive equipment and goods, but are not highly
occupied by people.
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Figure 4-22. Damage costs by structure
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Analysis of Equipment Items Involved in Incidents
The equipment categories found in the databases consist of about 80 categories.
It is possible to group many of these categories. Following is a list of equipment groups
that have been used to analyze and identify patterns of incident according to equipment:
• Cooking
• Heating
• Industrial
• Cooling
• Piping
• Other
Figure 4-23 illustrates the distribution of incidents according to the groups above.
The number of incidents where cooking equipment was involved is extremely high and
so is the number of incidents where heating equipment is involved. The distribution of
incidents of cooking equipment and heating equipment are presented in Figure 4-24 and
Figure 4-25 respectively.
The number of incidents where cooking equipment involved is extremely high
mainly because of incidents in which open fired grills were involved. The open fired
grill incidents outnumber portable cooking unit incidents (which has the next largest
number of incidents) by four times.
The number of heating equipment incidents is not as large as that of cooking
equipment. The majority of cooking equipment incidents involved fires and explosions.
However, many of the heating equipment incidents are carbon monoxide poisoning.
170
As for fatalities, the problematic issue of carbon monoxide poisoning, is carbon
monoxide’s ability to be attached to blood cells is about 200 times stronger than that of
oxygen. Moreover, carbon monoxide is colorless, has no smell, and usually claims its
victims while they are asleep, i.e.; the probability of severe consequences in carbon
monoxide incidents is higher.
Figure 4-23. Incidents by equipment category
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Figure 4-24. Incidents by type of cooking equipment
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These relationships are demonstrated in Figure 4-26 that presents the distribution
of fatalities versus group of equipment. As this figure reveals, incidents where heating
equipment was involved caused about three times as many fatalities compared to
cooking equipment incidents, although the number of cooking equipment incidents is
about three times larger than the number of heating equipment incidents. Figures 4-27
and Figure 4-28 consists of the distribution of fatalities by cooking equipment and
heating equipment respectively.
Figure 4-25. Incidents by type of heating equipment
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Among the cooking equipment, stoves are the leading equipment category that
cause fatalities. Among the heating equipment, portable space heaters are the deadliest
equipment, mainly because of carbon monoxide poisoning.
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Figure 4-27. Fatalities by type of cooking equipment
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Figure 4-29 shows the distribution of injuries according to the type of equipment
involved in the incident. As for injuries, industrial equipment is a significant factor in
causing injuries. Storage and process vessels, pumps, generators, compressors, casting,
molding, and forging equipment are including in this category. Figure 4-30 and Figure
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Figure 4-28. Fatalities by type of heating equipment
Figure 4-29. Injuries by type of equipment
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4-31 present injury distribution by type of cooking and heating equipment respectively.
Although open fire grills are involved in more than a thousand incidents in the database,
these incidents caused less than 100 injuries.
Heating equipment is a major concern in terms of severity of consequences. In
both fatalities and injuries, heating equipment claimed a significant number of victims.
In many of the fatalities where heating equipment was involved, the cause of death was
carbon monoxide poisoning, while heating equipment-related injuries are mainly
because of fires and explosions.
Figure 4-32 reveals the distribution of fires and explosions according to the type
of equipment. The correlation between the fires and explosions for each of the categories
is quite consistent; e.g., equipment category with the largest number of fires is the
category with the large number of explosions. However, among the cooking equipment
incidents, about 12% are explosions, while 23% of the heating equipment incidents are
explosions, i.e., heating equipment causes more explosions than fires compared to
cooking. Since industrial equipment incidents are mainly propane tank incidents, the
majority of these incidents are explosions as well.
61 59
33 27
99
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
O
p
en
F
ir
ed
G
ri
ll
U
n
cl
as
si
fi
ed
C
o
o
k
in
g
E
q
u
ip
m
en
t
F
ix
ed
S
to
v
en
F
ix
ed
O
v
en
P
o
rt
ab
le
C
o
o
k
in
g
,
W
ar
m
in
g
U
n
it
Figure 4-30. Injuries by type of cooking equipment
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As for property damage, in a single incident in a refinery in Baytown, Texas, a
pipe ruptured and caused $9,000,000 property damage. In another incident in Oklahoma,
failure of a process vessel caused $10,000,000 damage. Several other incidents caused
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Figure 4-31. Injuries by type of heating equipment
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property damage of several million dollars as well. The common thread to all of these
incidents is that they are RMP facilities. Incorporating data on RMP facilities distorts the
picture of property damage and therefore Figure 4-33 excludes damage to RMP
facilities. Figure 4-34 and Figure 4-35 demonstrate property damage by cooking and
heating equipment respectively.
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Figure 4-33. Property damage by equipment category. (Excluding RMP facilities) [$ million]
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The major property damage cost because of cooking equipment incidents is damage that
was caused by explosions and fires of open fired grills.
Property damage because of unclassified cooking equipment and other cooking
categories are quite low in comparison to the damage of grill incidents. Water heaters are
responsible for the highest property damage costs in the heating equipment category.
Propane is a combustible product and in cases of releases of large quantity near
population concentration, the population is required to be evacuated. The largest
population evacuation resulted because of industrial equipment. Among the types of
equipment, storage tank incidents led to evacuation of the majority of the population
under this category.
Three major incidents with very large LPG incidents caused the evacuation of
more than 8,700 people. A single piping rupture in a refinery in Ohio required the
evacuation of 131 persons. The distribution of number of people evacuated by type of
equipment is shown in Figure 4-36.
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Summary of Equipment Items Involved in Incidents
The severity of the categories can be evaluated by assigning severity level listed
in Table 4-16. Heating equipment, industrial equipment, other appliances, cooking
equipment, piping, and cooling equipment are the most significant categories in this
discussion. Table 4-18 presents theses categories after assignment of severity level to
each of the consequence dimensions, ranking the categories and organizing the data.
Table 4-18. Consequences severity of equipment categories
Equipment
Category
Number of
Incidents
Number of
Injuries
Number of
Fatalities
Property
Damage
Heating Elements 2 5 5 3
Cooking Equipment 4 5 3 3
Industrial
Equipment 1 5 2 5
Piping 1 2 2 3
Other Appliances 1 2 2 1
Cooling Equipment 1 1 1 1
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As table 4-18 reveals, the category with the most severe combination of
consequences is heating equipment. The number of fatalities because of heating
equipment is about three times higher than the number of fatalities in cooking equipment
incidents. However, the number of injuries in cooking equipment incidents is much
larger than that of heating equipment incidents.
In terms of property damage (excluding damage to RMP facilities), storage tank
(which is represented by the industrial equipment category) incident damage to property
is much larger then all other categories.
Analysis of Incidents Involving Vehicles
Several dozens of vehicle types exist in the database. For analysis purposes the
number is reduced by grouping them into 11 categories as follows:
• Recreational
• Propane delivery trucks
• Automobiles
• Mobile homes
• General use trucks
• Railroad
• Road transport vehicles (including public transportation)
• Heavy equipment (earth moving equipment, construction equipment, material
handling equipment, and other unclassified heavy equipment)
• Agricultural and gardening equipment
• Water vehicles
• Unclassified vehicle
Figure 4-37 illustrates incident distribution according to vehicle categories. As
Figure 4-37 reveals, mobile homes are by far the leading category. In many of the
mobile home incidents, the equipment involved was space heaters. Figure 4-38 presents
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the distribution of the number of fires and explosions according to vehicle categories.
The largest number of fires and explosions occurred in incidents where the vehicle
categories were mobile homes and recreational vehicles. Mobile home fire incidents
outnumber all the other categories.
The number of incidents of recreational vehicles, automobiles, and in railroad
vehicles is similar. The number of incidents of general use trucks is a little higher than
the rate of the last three categories. However, this rate is not exceptional, so general use
trucks incidents is excluded from this pattern. The number of incidents in compressed
gas and combustible liquefied trucks is not large in comparison to the other vehicles.
However, it is reasonable to believe that if these numbers were normalized by the
number of vehicles in each of the categories, these numbers would be larger than the
other vehicle categories. It is also important to remember that the probability that
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Figure 4-37. Incidents by type of vehicle
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incidents where compressed gas and combustible liquefied trucks are involved will be
reported is higher in comparison to the other categories.
This is because not only do these incidents have the same probability to be
reported to NFIRS like any other incidents, but also in several states, it is compulsory to
report on commercial propane related incidents. For example, in Texas, the Railroad
Commission conducts incident investigations and develops a report in these cases.
Moreover, HMIRS, which is a collection of vehicular transportation incidents, might
capture these incidents as well. This may explain the high ratio between the number of
incidents of compressed gas and combustible liquefied trucks and the other categories.
As Figure 4-39 reveals, recreational properties incidents led to the largest number
of fatalities. 75% of these victims died from carbon monoxide poisoning.
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These do not include carbon monoxide fatalities in tents and horse trailers, which
are not classified as recreational vehicles. Most of the fatalities in compressed gas and
combustible liquefied trucks incidents occurred during traffic incidents. The data lacks
the cause of deaths in these cases.
Carbon monoxide poisoning is the cause of death of four of the fatalities in the
automobile incidents. It is not clear what was the cause of deaths for three of the
fatalities. The report indicates criminal activity since a body was found in the trunk of a
car, and additional two people died in the explosion of the car. There is no information
with regard to why this incident was classified as a propane incident. For future work,
there need to be a resolution of how such incidents should be treated in the database.
As from injuries in propane-related incidents where a vehicle was involved, 80 of the
injuries in the heavy equipment category are from one incident in Ohio. There is no
additional information on this incident.
As would be expected, vehicle incidents create less property damage than
incidents in structures. Figure 4-40 demonstrates the distribution of injuries by vehicle
type. Figure 4-41 consists of distribution of property damage by vehicle categories.
Figure 4-39. Fatalities by type of vehicle
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The large damage where compressed gas and combustible liquefied trucks is the
type of vehicle involved, can be explained by the fact that these are large vehicles with
expensive equipments, and the damage in these incidents involves the total damage to
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Figure 4-40. Injuries by type of vehicle
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the trucks as well as the damage to properties involved in the incident. The damage in
mobile home incidents consists of many incidents with damage in the range of a few
thousands of dollars in each of the incidents.
As for evacuations, Compressed gas and flammable combustible liquid trucks
incident forced evacuation of several hundreds of people in each of the incidents, as
Figure 4-42 demonstrates.
Summary
General
Many entities are collecting data on incidents. These entities differ from each
other in their interests, data collection procedures, definitions, and scope. Extensive
efforts are required in order to integrate information from the data sources as well as to
identify the effects of the individual aspects of data collection procedures on the quality
and completeness of the data.
Phase I of this study consists of development of criteria, refining definitions and
taxonomy, development of procedures, and review of data sources to determine which of
these sources are useful for the project. Phase II consists of implementation of Phase I on
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Figure 4-42. Number of evacuated by type of vehicle
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data from 1998, integration of the data into a new database, data analysis, and
assessment of propane incidents nationwide.
In implementing Phases I and II, the performance of the propane industry was
assessed and revealed weaknesses, and factors that contribute to the areas of poor
performance. The results of this study allows to improve safety in the propane industry
by implementing changes in design, standardization of protection equipment and
sensors, and to tailor training programs that will address the weak spots that this study
reveals. An important aspect in assessing industrial safety performance is measurements
along time period of several years, to identify trends. However, the data that is required
to conduct this phase of the study is not available.
Estimation of Number of Propane-Related Incidents
The database developed in this study consists of 3,733 incidents. Statistical
methods were used to estimate the total number of incidents nationwide. These methods
resulted in an estimate of a total 13,000 propane related incidents in 1998. A separate
estimate indicates that in 1998 propane incidents resulted in 10,000 injuries involving
treatment in an emergency room. This latter source is a survey of emergency room and
includes only incidents with injuries. Another estimation indicates that 1,200 incidents
were directly related to propane industry facilities and operations.
Duplication Identification
Analysis of the data identified a relatively low number of duplications. The
majority of the duplications were found within the sources and not between them, i.e.,
the duplications are mainly because operators reported some incidents twice (or more).
The assumption is that significant improvements can be made by real-time data
collection. This is especially true for high consequence events that are more likely to be
reported by the news media.
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Statistical Summary
The following list is a statistical summary of the analysis:
• 4% of the incidents resulted in 137 fatalities
• 35 fatalities were due to carbon monoxide and 66 were due to fires and
explosions
• 15% of the incidents resulted in 1,012 injuries
• 82% of the incidents involved fires
• 14% of the incidents involved explosions
• About 1% of the incidents required evacuations
This study includes incident pattern identification as a function of equipment
involved in incidents, types of vehicles, types of structures, and causes. In 50% of the
incidents, cooking equipment was involved, and within the cooking equipment, open fire
grills are responsible for 55% of the incidents resulting in property damage of more then
6 million dollars.
Among the incidents involving vehicles, fires and explosions are primarily
reported at unclassified mobile properties and at mobile homes. Railroad transport
vehicles are responsible for about one-third of the fatalities involving vehicles. Heavy
equipment caused more than one-third of the vehicle-related injuries in one major
incident. Mobile home incidents are responsible for 18% of the injuries and 11% of the
fatalities in vehicle incidents. 12% of the injuries and one-third of the fatalities involved
recreational vehicles.
Root Causes
Root cause analysis is a complex task for incidents that have just occurred. For
incidents that have occurred years earlier it is even more difficult to determine root
causes. In many cases, the cause shown in the database was derived from a textual
description or was supplied by the reporting entity. It is thus important to point out that
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the descriptions could be interpreted in more than one way and the causes shown may
actually be contributing causes or the initiating event.
The number of incidents where equipment failure’was the cause outnumbered
by three times the incidents caused by upset conditions, and makes up about one-third of
the causes of the propane-related incidents. Though the frequency of incidents where
equipment failure is the cause is extremely high, incidents that were caused by upset
conditions and human error, resulted in consequences equal to or worse than those
resulting from equipment failures. Equipment failure caused about 23% of the property
damage.
Structures
Most of the fatalities and injuries occurred within residences. The structure
category with the second highest number of fatalities and injuries is unclassified
structures. Recreational facility incidents have a high number of fatalities, although a
low number of injuries are reported. Ignoring the damage within chemical industry
facilities, incidents in residences caused the most property damage (about 17% of the
sum of all property damage reported).
Future Improvement of Data Collection
The development of indicator-based industrial performance measurement
systems was explored in this study. However, this study lacks the identification of
trends that are helpful in determining whether the efforts invested toward safety
improvement lead to the desired results. In order to complete this phase of the study, this
methodology should be applied over a reasonable period of time in order to gain valid
results. The results herein provide an excellent baseline for performance measurement
by using the methodology as described above. However, it is important to point out that
in most cases, there is a two to three year delay in getting access to incident data from
existing data collection processes (e.g., NFIRS data collection of 1999 became available
in late 2002), and it takes three years to complete the data collection for a certain year. A
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systematic collection of news-clipping data for propane incidents is currently ongoing.
The data is being collected since the introduction of the Google news search engine in
September 2002. This source has proven to provide far more data than was available
previously and perhaps five times as much as in 1998. Thus in order to overcome the
time lag involved in using incident data from publicly available sources, the lack of root
cause information, and lack of reporting of all incidents; it is recommended to use a real-
time incident data collection.
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that propane incident data collection and consolidation
from a variety of sources is worthwhile, and that much can be learned from the
consolidated database. However a real-time incident data collection procedure must be
implemented in order to maximize the methodology.
There is an enormous potential in employing data collection from a variety of
information sources. This technique not only increases the amount of data captured by
individual sources but also the ability to capture more diverse and significant incidents.
The methodology used in this study resulted in the identification of one thousand
incidents beyond the 2,800 reported in NFIRS. The methodology also captured ten
times more fatalities than NFIRS.
The news-clippings search was applied as a data collection methodology. This
methodology was applied and made a significant contribution to the results. However,
this methodology is maximized only when applied in real-time because the data sources
are available for limited periods of time, and it is possible to solicit additional
information only during the period shortly after the incidents occur.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Measurements of Process Safety Elements Within Facilities
The models currently in use for measurement of process safety performance of
leading as well as trailing indicators has the major disadvantage of being dependent on
the evaluators’judgment. Therefore, the guideline in the development of the model in
this study was to establish a measurement system that is independent of the evaluator.
However, to eliminate subjectivity from the evaluators, several items in the model
needed to be standardized. This process required a survey of a panel of experts. The
Analytical Hierarchy Process technique has been developed to standardize the
Management of Change element of the OSHA PSM standard. Similarly, this method can
be applied to other elements in this standard.
Although sensitivity analysis has minor importance when a MCDM method is
applied to measure effects and not for selecting from a set of alternatives, this analysis
was conducted on the single branch that does not consist of robust criteria. This analysis
revealed the critical criterion. However, since the final preferences of the alternatives
that are to be reversed are nearly the same, the changes in the weights of criteria that are
required to reverse preferences is not large, especially with criteria of initial low weight.
The results of this study are consolidated to a form that is useful for process
safety performance measurements of Management of Change programs. This form is
presented in Appendix B.
Benchmarking of Process Safety Elements Among Facilities
OSHA PSM is a comprehensive standard. PSM element compartmentalization in
the standard creates an opportunity to develop measurement models for each of the
elements separately. The performance-based nature of the MOC element is apparent
from a reading of the regulatory requirements. Practices of OSHA PSM elements often
vary and there is a need to determine an industrial consensus or Recognized and
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Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP). The efforts in this study
aimed to develop a benchmark of industry practices for three of the process safety
management requirements. The benchmarking of PSM elements is a sequence composed
of 4 stages:
1. Decomposition of the element to its basic components
2. Questionnaire development
3. Surveying facilities
4. Results analysis
Emergency Preparedness and Response, Management of Change, and
Investigation of Chemical Process Incidents are three elements in process safety
programs. This study presents the results of implementing the four stages above on the
Management of Change and Emergency Planning elements, and the development of
questionnaire for the Process Safety Incident Investigation requirement.
Assessment of Industrial Safety Performance
Assessment based on a methodology of incident data collection from various sources is a
thorough process that has to be done carefully and in several stages. The primary focus of
industrial safety performance assessment, which uses the methodology employed in this study, is
to establish baseline metrics for the universe under investigation with regard to safety. This
requires definitions of indicators as the distribution of number of incidents, number of injuries,
property damage costs, releases of materials, hospitalizations, and evacuations and identification
of incident trends of these indicators. The consolidated database is then analyzed and correlated
across the causes of incidents, equipment involved, initiation events, location, and other
domains. Several of the sources that are available collect only part or a sample of the
information. However, it is possible to estimate the total number of incidents by applying
statistical tools on the data. Implementation of indicator-based industrial performance
measurement systems along several years helps to determine whether the efforts invested toward
safety improvement lead to the desired results. Other benefits are the ability to determine the
areas that will lead to major reduction of losses and reduction in the number of incidents.
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Among the major conclusions from applying the methodology on the propane industry is
to not be “misled” by the amount of data that a certain source may contain. In this study, a
single source of information (NFIRS) provided about two-third of the data; however, it failed to
collect significant data (e.g., failed to collect data with severe consequences). This conclusion
justified the efforts that were required to broaden the search and combination of sources of
information. Among the sources is a database that was established by a collection methodology
that is based on News Clips. This method uses search engines to query newspapers according to
a predetermined set of keywords. This method has several advantages including the ability to
further investigate the incident or to verify the information if required, if data is being collected
in real time.
As noted earlier, this study lacks the identification of trends that are helpful in
determining whether the efforts invested toward safety improvement lead to the desired
results. In order to complete this phase of the study, this methodology should be applied
on a reasonable period of time in order to gain valid results. The results herein provide a
baseline for performance measurement by using the methodology as described above.
However, it is important to point out that in most cases, there is a two to three year delay
in getting access to incident data from existing data collection processes (e.g., NFIRS
data collection of 1999 became available in late 2002), and it takes three years to
complete the data collection for a certain year. A timetable of real-time data collection is
presented in figure 4-43.
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Figure 4-43. Timetable of real-time data collection and analysis
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APPENDIX A
AWARENESS TRAINING AND AUDIT FREQUENCY CURVES
Awareness Training
First year:
9903.0
5918.3 2
2075.1
== R
X
y (A-1)
in the range 3-12 months.
Second Year:
0000.1383.1143.0103.5107 22335 =+•−••+••−= −− RXXXy (A-2)
in the range of 3-24 months.
Third year:
9989.02735.11046.0105.3104 22335 =+•−••+••−= −− RXXXy (A-3)
in the range of 3-36 months.
Fourth year:
13363.11319.0
102.7102102
2
233446
=+•−
••+••−••=
−−−
RX
XXXy
(A-4)
in the range of 3-36 months.
Fifth year and on:
12939.111132.0
105.5101101
2
233446
=+•−
••+••−••=
−−−
RX
XXXy
(A-5)
in the range of 3-36 months.
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Audit Frequency
First year:
Y=1 (A-6)
In the range of 3-6 months
14103.11084.6 22 =+••−= − RXy (A-7)
in the range 6-12 months.
Second Year:
Y=1 (A-8)
In the range of 3-6 months
0000.19496.0
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2
22335
=+
••+••−••=
−−−
R
XXXy
(A-9)
in the range of 3-24 months.
Third year:
Y=1 (A-10)
In the range of 3-6 months
12735.1
02.0105.2104
2
2335
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•+••−••=
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R
XXXy
(A-11)
in the range of 3-36 months.
Fourth year:
Y=1 (A-12)
In the range of 3-6 months
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in the range of 3-36 months.
Fifth year and on:
Y=1 (A-14)
In the range of 3-12 months
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in the range of 12-36 months.
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APPENDIX B
MOC PERFORMANCE CALCULATION FORM
Scope of Program
Check all the facilities to which your plant’s MOC program is applied to:
1. Critical sub-Areas ( 11F ):
a. OSHA PSM Areas 0.357
b. Atmospheric Tank Farm 0.110
c. Control Room 0.230
d. Process Safety Protection Systems 0.303
Sum of the values of the checked boxes: 11F =
2. Utility Sub Areas ( 12F ):
e. Cooling Water Facilities 0.165
f. Power Plant 0.392
g. Nitrogen System 0.279
h. Air Plant 0.165
Sum of the values of the checked boxes (e. to f. only): 12F =
3. Associated Sub Areas ( 13F ):
i. Laboratories 0.346
j. Facilities as Rail Car Wash Station 0.241
k. Facilities as Conveyors 0.204
l. Central Office Buildings 0.204
Sum of the values of the checked boxes (i. to l. only): 13F =
202
4. If Organizational Changes apply, then 14F =1.00
1
1W is the relative weight of the Critical sub-Areas
1
1W = 0.457
1
2W is the relative weight of the Utility sub-Areas
1
2W = 0.202
1
3W is the relative weight of the Associated sub-Areas
1
3W = 0.120
1
4W is the relative weight of Organizational Changes
1
4W = 0.221
The performance of the MOC program in terms of comprehensiveness of the Scope of
Program is calculated as follow:
1
4
1
4
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
Pr
FWFWFWFWF
ogramofScope
•+•+•+•= =______________ (B-1)
Authorization
5. Check the positions that should approve each type of MOCs in the list below:
Regular
MOC
Temporary
MOC
Emergency
MOC
MOC Coordinator 0.107 0.179 0.179
Operation
Manager/Maintenance Manager
0.357 0.291 0.291
Plant Manager 0.137 0.132 0.133
EH&S Officer 0.179 0.140 0.164
Engineering / Instrumentation 0.163 0.207 0.184
Executives 0.057 0.051 0.049
Sum of the checked box values
in each of columns: 2
1F =________
2
2F =________
2
3F =________
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2
1W is the relative weight of authorizing Regular MOC.
2
1W = 0.334
2
2W is the relative weight of authorizing Temporary MOC.
2
2W = 0.333
2
3W is the relative weight of authorizing Emergency MOC.
2
3W = 0.333
The performance of the MOC program with respect to the authorization process is
calculated as follows:
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1 FWFWFWF
ionAuthorizat
•+•+•= = _____________ (B-2)
Training
Check the group of employees that are subjected to the following MOC Training:
6. Awareness Training ( 31F ):
a. Field Operation Employees 0.525
b. Contractor Employees 0.334
c. Administrative Employees 0.142
Sum of the values of the checked boxes: 31F =
7. Procedure Updates ( 32F ):
d. Field Operation Employees 0.667
e. Contractor Employees 0.333
Sum of the values of the checked boxes: 32F =
8. Informal Information Transfer ( 33F ):
g. Field Operation Employees 0.667
h. Contractor Employees 0.333
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Sum of the values of the checked boxes: 33F =
3
1W is the relative importance of MOC Awareness Training.
3
1W = 0.500
3
2W is the relative importance of MOC Procedure Updates.
3
2W = 0.250
3
3W is the relative importance of Informal Information Transfer.
3
3W = 0.250
The performance of the MOC program in with respect to training employees is
calculated as follow:
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
1
3
1 FWFWFWF
Training
•+•+•= = ____________ (B-3)
Audit
9. Check all items that the Audit process addresses ( 41F ):
a. Proper implementation of training program 0.223
b. Misclassification of MOCs 0.173
c. Temporary MOCs 0.159
d. Emergency MOCs 0.159
e. Authorizations 0.127
d. Proper selection and implementation
    of hazard evaluation techniques 0.159
Sum of the values of the checked boxes: 41F =
10. Figure A-1 consists of 5 curves for five maturity levels of MOC programs. Match
your plant’s frequency performance value from Figure B -1 with the current audit
frequency, and the maturity level of the MOC program.
4
2F =___________
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4
1W is the relative importance of Audit Content.
4
1W = 0.750
4
2W is the relative importance of appropriate Audit frequency.
4
2W = 0.250
The performance of the MOC program with respect to the Audit process is calculated as
follows:
4
2
4
2
4
1
4
1 FWFWF
Audit
•+•= = ____________ (B-4)
Hazard Identification
11. Check all hazard evaluation techniques that are employed in hazard identification
in the MOC program ( 51F ):
a. Safety Review 0.216
b. What-if, Checklist What-if/Checklist 0.321
c. Advanced PHA techniques 0.349
d. Human Reliability Analysis Techniques 0.114
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Figure B-1. Audit frequency performance
Maturity Level
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Sum of the values of the checked boxes: 51F =
12. Obtain the Awareness Training performance value that was calculated
previously: 31F =
5
1W is the relative importance of hazard evaluation techniques.
5
1W = 0.500
5
2W is the relative importance of MOC Awareness Training
with respect to the Hazard Identification . 52W = 0.500
The performance of the MOC program in with respect to Hazard Identification is
calculated as follows:
3
1
5
2
5
1
5
1 FWFWF
tionIdentificaHazard
•+•= = ____________ (B-5)
Outcomes
13. Classification Failures ( 61F )
a.MWO-MOC Misclassifications
The following information is required to calculate the performance of MWO-
MOC misclassification:
• Number of Maintenance Work Orders (MWO) that were issued
during the period under investigation MWON
• Number of Management of Change Work Orders that were
issued during the period under investigation MOCN
• Number of MWO that should be treated as MOCs but were
misclassified iedmisclassifMOCN
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The dynamic factor of the MOC program (represent the level of activity of the
MOC program) should be calculated as follows:
MWO
MOCMWO
Dynamic
N
NN
F
−
= =___________ (B-6)
The performance of MWO-MOC misclassification with respect to the
classification failures should calculated as follow:
MOC
iedmisclassif
MOC
MOC
DynamicMOCMWO
N
NN
FF
−
=
− * =___________ (B-7)
b. Failures to Apply Temporary MOCs
The following information is required to calculate the value that will represent
the performance of failures to apply Temporary MOCs:
• Number of Temporary MOC Work Orders (Temp MOCs) that
were issued during the period under investigation TempN (this
number should include iedmisclassifTempN that is described bellow)
• Total number of Work Orders that should be treated as
Temporary MOCs but were miss-classified iedmisclassifTempN
The dynamic factor of the Temporary MOC section of the program should be
calculated as follows:
MOC
TempMOC
Dynamic
MOCTemp
N
NN
F
−
= =___________ (B-8)
The performance value that represent failures to apply Temporary MOCs are
calculated as follows:
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Temp
iedmisclassif
Temp
Temp
Dynamic
MOCTemp
FailuresTemp
N
NN
FF
−
•= =____________ (B-9)
c. Failure to Apply Emergency MOCs
The following information is required in order to calculate the value
representing the performance of failures to apply Emergency MOCs:
• Number of Emergency MOC work Orders (Emergency MOCs)
that were issued during the period under investigation EmergencyN
(this number should include iedmisclassifEmergencyN which is described
below)
• Total number of Work Orders that should be treated as
Emergency MOCs but were misclassified iedmisclassifEmergencyN
The dynamic factor of the Temporary MOC section of the program (which
represent the level of activity of Emergency MOCs with respect to the activity
of the MOC program) should be calculated as follows:
MOC
EmergencyMOC
Dynamic
MOCEmergency
N
NN
F
−
= =____________ (B-10)
The performance value that represent failures to apply Emergency MOCs
should calculated as follow:
Emergency
iedmisclassif
Emergency
Emergency
Dynamic
MOCEmergency
FailuresEmergency
N
NN
FF
−
•= =_______ (B-11)
209
MOCMWO
FailurestionClassificaW
− is the relative importance of MWO-MOC misclassifications with
respect to the Classification Failures sub-criterion. MOCMWO FailurestionClassificaW
− = 0.334
MOCTemp
FailurestionClassificaW is the relative importance of failures to apply Temporary MOCs
with respect to the Classification Failures sub-criterion. MOCTemp FailurestionClassificaW = 0.333
MOCEmergency
FailurestionClassificaW is the relative importance of failures to apply Emergency MOCs
with respect to the Classification Failures sub-criterion. MOCEmergency FailurestionClassificaW = 0.333
The performance of the Classification Failures with respect to the Outcomes is
calculated as follows:
____________
6
1
=•+
•+•=
−−
ailuresEmergencyFMOCEmergency
estionFailurClassifica
FailuresTempMOCTemp
estionFailurClassifica
MOCMWOMOCMWO
estionFailurClassifica
FW
FWFWF
(B-12)
14. Authorization Failures ( 62F )
a.Failures to Appropriately Authorize
The information that is required to calculate the affect of Authorization
Failures is the number of MOCs whose authorization failure was not completed
ionAuthorizatN . The performance value of MOCs that were not authorized properly
should be calculated as follows:
MOC
ionAuthorizatMOC
ionAuthorizat
N
NN
F
−
= =_______________ (B-13)
MOCMWO
FailuresionAuthorizatW
− is the relative importance of MWO-MOC misclassifications with
respect to the Authorization Failures sub-criterion. MOCMWO FailuresionAuthorizatW
− = 0.286
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MOCTemp
FailuresionAuthorizatW is the relative importance of failures to apply Temporary MOCs
with respect to the Authorization sub-criterion. MOCTemp FailuresionAuthorizatW = 0.286
MOCEmergency
FailuresionAuthorizatW is the relative importance of failures to apply Emergency MOCs
with respect to the Authorization Failures sub-criterion. MOCEmergency FailuresionAuthorizatW = 0.286
ionAuthorizat
FailuresionAuthorizatW is the relative importance of failures to authorize MOCs with respect to
the Authorization Failures sub-criterion. ionAuthorizat FailuresionAuthorizatW = 0.143
The performance of the Authorization Failures with respect to the Outcomes is
calculated as follows:
ionAuthorizationAuthorizat
FailuresionAuthorizat
ailuresEmergencyFMOCEmergency
FailuresionAuthorizat
FailuresTempMOCTemp
FailuresionAuthorizat
MOCMWOMOCMWO
FailuresionAuthorizat
FWFW
FWFWF
•+•+
•+•=
−−6
2
(B-14)
_________62 =F
15. Hazard Detection Failures ( 63F )
a. Failures to Apply Appropriate Hazard Evaluation Techniques
The information required to calculate the affect of failures to apply
appropriate hazard evaluation techniques is the number of MOCs with an
incomplete hazard evaluation TechniqueHazN . The performance should be
calculated as follows:
MOC
TechniqueHazMOC
FailuresHaz
N
NN
F
−
= =__________ (B-15)
b. Awareness Training Frequency
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The Failure to Properly Train measures the appropriateness of the Awareness
Training frequency. Figure B-2 (below) consists of 5 curves for five maturity
levels of MOC. With the current Awareness Training frequency, and the
maturity level of the MOC program, obtain the frequency performance value
( TrainingF ).
MOCMWO
FailuresHazW
− is the relative importance of MWO-MOC misclassifications with respect to
the Hazard Detection Failures sub-criterion. MOCMWOFailuresHazW
− = 0.168
MOCTemp
FailuresHazW is the relative importance of failures to apply Temporary MOCs with respect
to the Hazard Detection Failures sub-criterion. MOCTempFailuresHazW = 0.180
MOCEmergency
FailuresHazW is the relative importance of failures to apply Emergency MOCs with
respect to the Hazard Detection Failures sub-criterion. MOCEmergencyFailuresHazW = 0.162
ionAuthorizat
FailuresHazW is the relative importance of failures to authorize MOCs with respect to the
Hazard Detection Failures sub-criterion. ionAuthorizatFailuresHazW = 0.070
TechniquesHaz
FailuresHazW is the relative importance of properly applying hazard evaluation
techniques with respect to the Hazard Detection Failures sub-criterion.
TechniquesHaz
FailuresHazW = 0.113
Trainoperly
FailuresHazW
Pr is the relative importance of proper training frequency with respect to the
Hazard Detection Failures sub-criterion. TrainoperlyFailuresHazW
Pr = 0.306
Figure A-2 consists of 5 curves for five maturity levels of MOC programs. Match the
frequency performance value from Figure B-2 with the current Awareness Training
frequency, and the maturity level of the MOC program:
=
TrainingF ____________
212
Figure B-2. Awareness training frequency performance
The performance of the Authorization Failures with respect to the Outcomes is
calculated as follows:
TrainingTraining
FailureHaz
FailureHazTechniqueHaz
FailuresHaz
ionAuthorizationAuthorizat
FailuresHaz
ailuresEmergencyFMOCEmergency
FailuresHaz
FailuresTempMOCTemp
FailuresHaz
MOCMWOMOCMWO
FailuresHaz
FWFW
FWFW
FWFWF
•+•+
•+•+
•+•=
−−6
3
(B-16)
____________63 =F
Summary of the Outcomes Criteria:
6
1W is the relative weight of the Classification failures sub-criterion.
6
1W =0.321
6
2W is the relative weight of the Authorization Failures sub-criterion.
6
2W =0.225
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6
3W is the relative weight of the Hazard Detection Failures sub-criterion.
6
3W =0.454
The performance of the Outcomes criterion with respect to the MOC Program
performance is given as follows:
6
3
6
3
6
2
6
2
6
1
6
1
6
FWFWFWF •+•+•= =_____________ (B-17)
Calculating the OVERALL Program Performance
The relative weight of each of the major criteria is as follows:
1
W is the relative weight of the Scope of Program. 1W = 160
2
W is the relative weight of the Authorization process 3W = 0.123
3
W is the relative importance of the MOC Training program. 1W = 0.234
4
W is the relative importance of the Audit Process. 4W = 0.074
5
W is the relative importance of the Hazard Identification process. 5W = 0.230
6
W is the relative importance of the Outcomes. 6W = 0.178
The final value of the program performance ePerformancF should be calculated as
follows:
665544332211
FWFWFWFWFWFWF
ePerformanc
•+•+•+•+•+•= (B-18)
ePerformanc
F =___________
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APPENDIX C
LIST OF DATA FIELDS
1. accident_causes
2. accident_corrective_actions
3. accident_deaths
4. accident_environmental_impacts
5. accident_evacuations
6. accident_explosions
7. accident_fires
8. accident_flammable_mixtures
9. accident_hospitalizations
10. accident_injuries
11. accident_property_damage
12. accident_release_sources
13. accident_released_chemicals
14. accident_releases
15. accident_shelterings
16. accident_treatments
17. accident_unique_causes
18. accident_unique_corrective_actions
19. accident_unique_environmental_impacts
20. accident_unique_release_sources
21. chemical_categories_involved
22. chemicals_involved
23. chemicals_involved_flammable_mixtures
24. event_equipment
25. event_facilities
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26. event_locations
27. event_naics
28. event_vehicles
29. events
30. facilities
31. facility_employee_count
32. facility_processes
33. process_chemicals
34. process_flammable_mixtures
35. process_naics
36. safety_inspections
216
VITA
Nir Keren
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center
Texas A&M University System, 3574 TAMU
College Station, Texas 77843-3574
Address: 11/B Rimmonim st., Safed 13206, Israel
Education
2001-2003 Doctor of Philosophy, Interdisciplinary Engineering, Mary Kay
O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M University, College
Station, Texas.
1996 – 1998 M.S., Management and Safety Engineering Department at the
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel (graduated magna
cum laude).
1986 – 1990 B.S., Mechanical Engineering Department at the Ben Gurion
University of the Negev, Israel.
Experience
1999 – 2000 Maintenance Manager at a sulfuric acid plant, Rotem Amfert
Group (Subsidiary of Israel Chemicals) Negev, Israel.
1998 – 1999 Maintenance Manager at the Fine Chemical Divition,
Dead Sea Bromine Compounds Group
(Subsidiary of Israel Chemicals), Israel.
1995 – 1997 Project Manager and departmental safety engineer, N.R.C.N. –
Israel.
1992 – 1995 Maintenance Manager, N.R.C.N – Israel.
1990 – 1992 Maintenance Engineer, N.R.C.N – Israel.
